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ABSTRACT 
Marriage, Fertility, and Labor Market Prospects in the United States, 1960-2000. 
(August 2005) 
Yu-Chen Kuo, B.A.; National Central University; 
M.S.; National Sun Yat-Sen University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Donald Deere 
 
 
Over the past forty years a tremendous number of women have entered the labor 
market, removing stay-home motherhood as the most dominant female occupation. The 
linkage between the change in the labor market and change in family structure has drawn 
a lot of attention from social scientists, and it is on this linkage that this analysis is 
focused.  
An essential dimension of this changing behavior is the sharp rise in out-of-
wedlock childbearing. The central issue of non-married motherhood is more related to 
the diminishing willingness to marry than a changing attitude toward fertility. In a 
setting where individuals choose marriage because of the gains from joint production of 
child quality as well as the division of labor, the declining gains from specialization for 
men influence potential spouse selection. Men and women with fewer labor market 
prospects become less desirable, and consequently a marriage market with more positive 
assortative mating will be observed.  
The increase in female labor market participation is larger for highly-educated 
women but the decrease in marriage rates is more characteristic of less-educated women 
over this period. What drives these changes can be explained by using a simple 
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economic theory, the fundamental concept of which is that couples with lower labor 
market prospects also face lower gains from marriage because of the increases in female-
male relative wages in the less-educated and black groups. A narrowing of the gap 
between male and female wages would reduce the gains from division of labor and 
lower the incentive to marry. In addition, when the marriage market becomes more 
positively assorted, low educated men and women are less likely to marry each other. 
Our empirical results indicate an increase in the homogeneity of wages between 
spouses over this period regardless of whether we control for education. In particular, 
black couples are more positively assorted than white couples although the trend 
converges by the end of the century. We also show that the marriage market is tilted 
towards better-educated men and women over the period. These findings are consistent 
with the theory which explains why single motherhood is more concentrated among less-
educated women.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the latter half of the twentieth century, the possibility of getting married was 
much greater than in the years prior to World War II, with the average age of a first 
marriage much less than before the 1950s.1 It was also the time during which the fertility 
rate was highest and, as a result, has become known as the baby boom period. The 
experience of this “baby boom” and subsequent “marriage boom” created a general 
consensus that people should marry in their twenties, form families and have children. In 
recent decades, however, family-formation behavior in the United States has changed 
drastically. The concept of family and the role of marriage for current generations are 
very different from those of older generations. Since that time, a tremendous number of 
women entered the labor market with the result that stay-home moms are no longer in 
the majority. The linkage between the changes in the labor market and family structure 
since the 1960s has drawn a lot of attention from social scientists and it is on this linkage 
that this analysis is focused. This research primarily concerns the relationship between 
labor market decisions and family structure choices. Regarding family structure choices, 
we focus on the decisions of marriage and fertility in particular. Due to the complexity 
of this question, we plan to explore this topic in two steps. 
The first step focuses on the interaction between marriage and fertility decisions. 
An essential dimension of the changing family structure is the sharp rise in out-of-
wedlock childbearing. Figure 1 from the vital statistics report (Ventura 1998) shows 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style and format of The American Economic Review. 
1 See Rodgers and Thornton (1985) for example. 
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that the percentage of births to unmarried mothers has increased consistently over the 
last four decades. Moreover, there persisted substantial discrepancies among racial and 
ethnic groups. Before 1969, less than 10 percent of births were out-of-wedlock. Thirty 
years later, approximately one-third of total births were to unmarried mothers. The 
numbers are even more stunning for African-American women, with more than two-
thirds of births to unmarried mothers in 1999.  
After peaking in the baby boom period of the 1950s, fertility rates dropped 
sharply. As shown in Figure 2, the fertility rate remained stable after 1973. Fertility 
rates, defined as the number of births per 1,000 women aged 15-44, stayed within the 
interval of 65~71 from 1973 to 1999. Also, an upward trend for the birth rates of 
unmarried women through the period exists despite the fact that the trend leveled off 
after 1990. In other words, it is more common today to see women bear a child outside 
marriage. Marriage does not appear to be a prerequisite for having children. 
The central question that needs to be addressed is why couples are less likely to 
marry. A popular speculation is that women substitute jobs for husbands. Women can 
now acquire resources from the labor market, and, as a consequence, marriage became 
less attractive for them. However, many less-educated or black women have children 
and low-paying jobs. If this hypothesis is correct, the change should work in the opposite 
direction. On the contrary, a larger proportion of less-educated women are single 
mothers. Therefore, more financial independence should not be the only reason for not 
getting married.  
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In this section, we first address the central issue of out-of-wedlock childbearing, 
and argue that it is due more to diminishing willingness to marry than to changing 
attitudes toward fertility. Then we provide a simple theory to interpret the cause of 
increasing out-of-wedlock childbirth and why single motherhood is consistently more 
concentrated among either the less-educated or black women. We believe the key to 
answering these questions is the changing patterns of the marriage market which is more 
inclined to be positively assorted on economic traits. 
The second step of this analysis is more related to the decisions between marriage 
and labor market participation. Of course, fertility decisions cannot be separated from 
the marital decision process. In 1960, most women stayed out of the labor force after 
marriage or after they had children. However, in 2000 approximately 74 percent of 
women between the ages of 25-54 and 60 percent of women who gave birth in the 
previous year were in the labor force. The particiation of married women in the labor 
force is not as different from that of single women as it used to be. With female labor 
market advances in getting more opportunities, we would expect women to be better off. 
Yet marriage rates have declined and the relative economic plight of some women is 
actually worse. The increase in female labor force participation is larger for highly-
educated women but the decrease in marriage is more serious for less-educated women 
over the period. This trend is even more remarkable for women with young children. 
More recently, cohorts of college women have been more able to maintain both a family 
and career at the same time, while less-educated women are more likely to stay in single 
motherhood and remain unemployed. In this section, we investigate the association 
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between the gains from marriage and from the labor market. We show the marriages of 
couples both with less education have fewer gains than those of couples both with better 
education, and, as a result, marriages at lower education level are less likely to happen or 
more likely to end with a divorce. Put differently, the kind of marriage formed by 
couples both with fewer labor market prospects is relatively marginal. A marriage 
market with more positive assortative mating would further lessen the likelihood of two 
less-educated individuals getting married. The reason is that the benefits from the 
specialization are even lower and reduce the possibility of forming a marriage. 
After discussing the data we used in this dissertation, Section II will document 
trends in marriage and fertility over the last four decades. Some previous studies related 
to this analysis are addressed in Section III. Section IV posits a simple theory to interpret 
the implications of the changes in an increasingly positive sorting marriage market. In 
Section V, we provide more information regarding female labor force participation and 
participation-related behaviors. We then examine the association between the marriage 
and labor market on the basis of the model from Section IV. In Section VI, we attempt to 
show evidence of increasingly positively correlated educational backgrounds and wages 
between spouses over the period. With this result, we reach our conclusions about the 
potential importance of assortative mating in the marriage market in explaining the 
unmarried childbearing changes observed over the period. Section VII concludes.  
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2. BACKGROUND 
2.1. Data 
This study uses data from the June Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1971, 
the earliest available year, to 2000. The June files contain the core questions included in 
every CPS as well as a special series of questions which investigate the issues of 
marriage and childbearing. The interviews were not conducted every year and questions 
about complete marriage and fertility history were only asked every five years. Before 
1980, most of the questions about fertility history were presented solely to ever-married 
women. In 1975, for example, the CPS only collected information about birth history 
from ever-married women. After 1980, all women aged 18-44 were asked to answer 
questions related to their marriage and fertility history. In 2000, however, only 
information about first marriage and last birth are available.  
For the years prior to 1971, we use another source from the Census Integrated 
Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS). The census is a representative sample that 
collects some basic information related to marriage and fertility issues. All respondents 
were asked to report their current marital status and female respondents were asked their 
total births. Respondents were not asked about history of marital status and fertility. 
Due to changes in IPUMS survey questions over time, we are not able to produce 
exactly the same measures of hours of work and hourly wage rates over the entire 
period. In this regard, we use the March CPS to provide some extra information. The 
March CPS contains the data on labor force participation and is useful in computing 
wage-related variables such as weeks worked in the previous year and usual work hours 
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per week. We also utilize this dataset to report some companion information from a 
cohort perspective.  
We rely more on the CPS data for analyzing trends in marriage, fertility and out-
of-wedlock childbearing. We use the 1/100 Samples of the IPUMS from 1960-2000 for 
the discussion related to assortative mating. More details about further restriction of data 
are addressed in the text. 
2.2. Documentation of the Trends in Marriage, Fertility and Out-of-wedlock 
Childbearing 
Trends in marriage  
The proportion of men and women ever married in the U.S. has declined across 
all demographic and social groups since 1960. Table 1 summarizes the percentage of 
men and women who have ever been married by several categories over time. In 1960, 
74.8 percent of men and 84.5 percent of women aged 18-44 had ever been married. By 
the turn of the millennium, the numbers dropped to 58.8 percent and 66.3 percent, 
respectively. One may suspect that a change in demographic composition is causing the 
decrease. In fact, relative to 1970, the average level of schooling has increased, there are 
more Hispanics, and the general population aged 18-44 has a higher average age. As a 
result, the proportion of the ever-married population is even lower compared to 1970 
after the change in demographic composition is adjusted as seen in Table 1.2 An even 
                                                 
2 In 2000, if the same educational and demographic composition in 1970 is imposed, 52.5 percent of men 
and 61.3 percent of women were ever married; six and five percentage points lower compared to the 
original figures.   
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more pronounced downward trend is observed when we focus on those currently married 
instead of those ever married. The likelihood of being ever married is positively 
associated with educational level. College graduates were more likely than high school 
dropouts to marry regardless of the compositional changes within education as shown in 
the bottom panel in the table. Blacks are the ethnic group with the least likelihood to get 
married, while the whites are the most likely to get married. A relative smaller portion of 
the population of the northeast is never married, which has something to do with the 
average higher schooling in this region. Men and women at higher education levels tend 
to marry at later ages.  
One explanation for the smaller fraction of the married population is the 
postponement of the first marriage. Table 2 confirms this statement. In the early 1960s, 
the median age of women at their first marriage was 20.1 years old. In 1990-1994, this 
number rose by 4.9 to 25 years. A more pronounced delay in first marriage was observed 
for highly-educated women. The mean age for college graduates increased from 21.9 in 
1960-1964 to 27.2 in 1990-1994. Across racial and ethnic group, black women are 
increasingly less likely to be married, and inclined to marry at older ages. Across 
regions, the average age at first marriage is greater in the northeast; again, this is 
associated with the average higher education. The majority of people consider the 
possibility of marriage after completing their education.  
Despite the fact that the postponement of first marriage increases the proportion 
of single adults, it is not the whole story. For many women, delaying marriage often 
means never marrying. Figure 3 shows the percentage of men and women who were ever 
   
 
8
married by age relative to 1970. For women over age 30 and men over age 35, the lines 
for 1960 and 1970 almost overlap. That suggests that the disparities in the ever-married 
proportion of the population among the two census years are minuscule after a certain 
age. By age 30 for women and age 35 for men, ninety percent of individuals had already 
married. After 1970, however, there is an increased tendency of delayed first marriage 
for both men and women as demonstrated by the wider gap in the early twenties in the 
graph as well as the postponement of convergence to the 1970’s line. The 1980’s data 
converges at age 38 for women and 36 for men. The lines for 1990 and 2000 never fully 
converge with 1970 but the gap lessens over time. This implies not only that people have 
their first marriage much later in life but also that fewer people choose to ever marry. 
Presumably, if single individuals spend more time searching for a partner and 
therefore postpone marriage, it is reasonable to think the quality of the match they find 
would be better. However, the time series findings seem inconsistent with such a 
prediction. First marriages are more likely to dissolve and the overall average first 
marriage length is shorter over time as seen in Table 3. In 1995, for women aged 18-54, 
33 percent of first marriages ended, a 13 percentage point increase compared to 1971,3 
and the average first marriage length is almost fourteen months shorter;4 it implies the 
shorter expected duration of a marriage. In addition, the remarriage rate conditional on 
                                                 
3 The number is listed in the column of proportion of complete spell. 
4 We select sample with the women who had ever been married and separate them into two groups. One is 
women with a first marriage dissolution and the other is women still currently married by the date of 
survey. The simple average of their length of first marriage by their fractions to the total sample size gives 
us the overall average first marriage spell. 
 
   
 
9
first marriage dissolution is not higher in 1995 than in 1971. 5  We can draw the 
conclusion that more people stay single longer and spend less of their lifetimes in 
marriage.  
Trends in fertility  
 After the baby boom, birth rates dropped sharply in the 1960s and early 1970s. 
As seen in Figure 2, the total fertility rate is consistently stable between 1973 and 1999 
except for a slight peak in 1990. Table 4 tabulated from the CPS shows a similar pattern. 
After 1977, the birth rate was roughly 66~71 births per 1,000 women aged 18-44. High 
school dropouts and Hispanic females aged 25-34 have higher fertility rates than the 
population average. The table also shows that women with a college degree or in the 
older age group are more likely to have a birth in a year compared to their counterparts 
in 1977. Between 1977 and 2000, however, the changes in magnitude are not very 
dramatic. This seems inconsistent with the prediction from the standard economic 
fertility model.6 With improved opportunities in labor market for women, we should 
observe obvious declines in birth rates if the substitution effect dominated the income 
effect in the fertility decisions of women.7 Note that while the total fertility rates haven’t 
dropped dramatically, the changes of the various groups differ over the period:  (a) the 
                                                 
5 Percent of women aged 18-44with first marriage dissolution who have a second marriage is 62 percent in 
1975, and 58 percent in 1995. 
6 Following Becker (1965), a standard time allocation and demand for children model gives the prediction 
that higher income is associated with a higher cost of female time because of increased female wage rates. 
Income effect could play some role in this case. 
7 The birth rates in the U.S. are relatively higher than other developed countries. In 2000, the birth rate is 
14.4 in the U.S., 11.3 in Canada, 13.1 in France, 11.4 in the U.K. and 9.5 in Japan. Birth rates are 
calculated by dividing the number of live births in a population in a year by the midyear resident 
population of women ages 18-44. 
 
   
 
10
fertility rate for women at older group has increased. (b) Black women’s fertility rate has 
declined since the 1970s. (c) More importantly, the fertility rate for never-married 
women is almost doubled in 2000 compared to 1977 in contrast to the slightly 
decreasing rate for currently married women.  
Following the postponement of first marriage, the mother’s age at first birth is 
five years later in the 1990s than in the 1960s as reported in Table 5. Instead of initial 
childbearing occurring in the early twenties, most women had their first births in their 
middle or late twenties. The delay in the timing of birth is more pronounced for college 
graduates and whites. Examining the mean age at first marriage, we see the mean 
difference of age at first marriage and first birth is narrower in the 1990s than in the late 
1970s. This occurs despite the fact that women who are childless at the time of marriage 
wait the same amount of time before their first birth as did similar women in the late 
1970s. The lag between the time of women’s first marriage and the time they had their 
first children has been consistently about two years since 1975-1979.8 The narrowing 
gap is driven by the increasing number of women who are already mothers at the time of 
first marriage. These mothers’ first birth was an out-of-wedlock birth, and this trend 
drives down the gap between age at first marriage and age at time of first birth. 
Another view from the comparison across the ten-year cohorts is reported in 
Table 6. As indicated by the diagonal dashed line in the top panel of the table, the 
fertility patterns of ever-married women are similar among cohorts born in 1955-1964 
                                                 
8 Using the mean age at first birth with marriage as shown in the last column in Table 5 and mean age at 
first marriage in Table 2, the difference between the two ranges from 1.9 to 2.0 years among the period 
1975~1979 to 1990~1994. 
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(ages 15-24 in 1970), 1965-1974 (ages 15-24 in 1980) and 1975-1984 (ages 15-24 in 
1990). In contrast, there is a noticeable increase in the average number of children born 
to single women for all age groups since 1970. From panel B, we see the average 
number of children for women aged 18-44 rose from 0.12 in 1970 to 0.42 in 2000. The 
increase is also observed across cohorts. This result is in line with the findings in Figure 
2.  
Unlike the fertility pattern, the marriage pattern differs across cohorts over the 
same time period, 1970-2000. Cohorts born after 1955-1964 tend to stay single longer, 
and are more likely to end their marriage. The differential between the fraction of 
women ever married and fraction currently married for women aged 15-44 increased 
from 0.04 in 1960 to 0.09 in 2000, and implying a growing divorce rate over the period.  
Trends in out-of-wedlock childbearing 
While the vast majority of people still choose to get married first and then have 
children, the percentage of births to unmarried women has increased steadily over the 
past fifty years. Table 7 and Figure 1 both demonstrate this trend. In 1971, only 7 
percent of the births belonged to currently unmarried women. In 2000, the percentage 
rises to more than one-fourth. Panel B in Table 7 shows non-married motherhood to be 
much more common among less-educated or black women. Of those women who 
reported that they had given birth in the previous year, 60 percent of black women and 
41 percent of high school dropouts were not currently married. This number understates 
the out-of-wedlock birth ratio if we consider that some women gave birth in the previous 
year and got married before the time of survey. Table 8 adds to this analysis, providing 
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information about the proportion of never-married women who reported that they had at 
least one child at the time of survey between 1971 and 2000. The percentage of births to 
unmarried women rose between 1971 and 2000 regardless of the demographic 
characteristics of the women. It is worth noting that the increasing trend occurs within 
every educational group. The bottom panel in Table 8 confirms the same upward trend 
after the compositional change is taken into consideration within each educational 
group.9  
Table 9 demonstrates the fraction of women aged 18-44 with marriage 
experience who had not had any children at the time of survey. As the table shows, the 
percentage fluctuates between 18 and 19 after 1977. Within racial and ethnic group, the 
numbers are also quite stable. The changes in demographic composition within 
education do not affect the constant trend. When the demographic weight was adopted in 
1977, 10  the fraction of childless ever-married women classified by education has 
remained pretty constant. However, we do observe an increase over time in the 
percentage of women in the oldest age group choosing not to have any children. Figure 4 
provides a similar picture. Married women delayed their first birth due to postponement 
of first marriage and slightly fewer women did not have children by the end of 
reproductive age in 1990 and 2000 as compared to 1970.11  The result is generally 
consistent with Figure 2 from the Vital Statistics Report and verifies that the fertility rate 
                                                 
9 Within the educational group, the percentages in 2000 are all larger relative to 1971 or 1977. After 
adjusting for compositional change, the result still holds although the numbers are smaller except for high 
school dropouts. 
10 We use the demographic weight in 1977 as base year because the question of Hispanic ethnicity was not 
asked before 1973.  
11 The reproductive age is referred as 15-44 years of age. 
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of married women is slightly lower, while the fertility pattern has not differed 
dramatically over time. 
In the past, a shotgun wedding was a normal occurrence in the event of a 
premarital pregnancy. The declining practice of marriage after premarital pregnancy 
accounts for a certain part of the increase in single-mother families in modern society. 
Table 10 shows the proportion of women who entered a marriage following a premarital 
first birth. It also provides data on length of time from first premarital birth to marriage. 
The percentage of women aged 18-44 with a premarital first birth increased 22.1 points 
between 1971 and 1995. Using simple weighted methods, 12  the overall average 
premarital spell length (the average months between the time of first premarital birth to 
the date of first marriage) is more than two years longer in 1971 than in 1995. There is 
no doubt that on average women stayed longer in single motherhood.  
In short, the core of rising out-of-wedlock childbearing is mainly caused by the 
marriage decision, not a change in fertility rates. In the old days, women would wait to 
have children until they found a husband, or would get married in the event of 
pregnancy. Today the majority of women still make their fertility decisions based on 
marital status. However, an increasing number of women make their fertility decision in 
the absence of marriage and may or may not choose marriage after becoming mothers. If 
we think the proportion of women choosing to have children is very close today to 1970 
levels, then the major change over the last thirty years is that more women with children 
are choosing to have those children outside of marriage. 
                                                 
12 A similar method to Table 3. 
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Becker (1973, 1981) defined the concept of marriage from an economic point of 
view as a union of joint production and consumption. Most economic studies follow this 
line and view decreasing marriage rates as a result of a decline in gains from 
specialization and trading. Blackburn and Korenman (1994) showed that the marriage 
premium has greatly declined in the CPS data, and Gray (1997) found similar results. A 
few studies addressed issues about the relationship between the marriage market and 
female labor force participation decisions. For instance, Grossbard-Shechtman (1984), 
and Grossbard-Shechtman and Neuman (1988) observed that a marriage market that 
favors women would cause a decrease female labor participation rates. Blau, Kahn and 
Waldfogel (2000) also found that better female labor markets are associated with lower 
marriage rates. Some researchers argued the sex ratio, i.e., relative number of men and 
women, is fundamental to rates of marriage and female labor force participation. Angrist 
(2002) suggested that high sex ratios had a large positive effect on the likelihood of 
female marriage, and a large negative effect on female labor force participation. 
There is an abundant literature on family fertility decisions. Hotz, Klerman and 
Willis (1997) provided a thorough survey of theoretical models and empirical 
approaches in analyzing fertility decisions. Most of the models view marriage as a 
presumption and then discuss the time allocation and fertility decisions inside the 
household. This assumption leads to the problem that the growing number of single-head 
households do not fit the models very well, and that a different specification is needed to 
target out-of-wedlock childbearing decisions. 
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For a long time social scientists have observed a significant change in 
childbearing behavior. In the seventies some economists started to be aware of and 
contributed to the issue. Non-marital birth rates have risen since 1940 with a more 
drastic rise taking place after the 1960s. A long line of research has attempted to 
understand whether the availability and generosity of social welfare assistance affects 
fertility and marriage decisions. In particular, the linkage between Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) and non-marital fertility is at the center of the debate. The 
effect of welfare benefits, however, is not clear. Moffitt (1992) provided a 
comprehensive review of the literature. Among nineteen studies that control for state 
fixed effects, eleven found higher AFDC benefits increase fertility, six found an 
insignificant effect, and two reported a mixed effect. Moffit concluded: “Welfare policy 
influences fertility, but the evidence is very weak to give a definitive policy suggestion.” 
Some research has looked at the differences among racial and social groups. The 
popular book, The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public 
Policy by Wilson (1987), found that “marriageable” men were relatively scarce in the 
underclass due to higher rates of unemployment and incarceration. Consequently, out-of-
wedlock childbearing was more likely to happen in the lower portion of the income 
distribution. The higher the percentage of employed men in a community, the lower the 
proportion of nonmarital births should be. This underclass phenomenon is also included 
in Willis’ (1999) model. There have been some empirical studies of Wilson’s theory. 
Wood (1995), for example, used 1970 and 1980 Standard-Metropolitan-Statistical-Area 
(SMSA) level census data to estimate a fixed-effect model of the black marriage rate. He 
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found that the shrinking pool of “marriageable” black men could explain 3 to 4 percent 
of the decline in the black marriage rate.  
The majority of married couples will have children sooner or later. People may 
make their marital decision in conjunction with their reproductive decisions. In other 
words, a couple may decide to get married at the time they plan to have children 
together. Building on Weiss and Willis (1985), Willis (1999) assumed children are 
collective goods for parents and parents care about their children’s welfare. An efficient 
provision of collective goods requires each beneficiary to share its cost. A marriage is a 
pareto improvement for men and women as it reduces costs for children. Children also 
gain from marriage because more resources are spent on them. Given an equal 
population of men and women, if both the father and mother value their children’s 
welfare, it is best for them to form a union, i.e., marriage. Willis called this the 
“Traditional Marriage Equilibrium”. A traditional equilibrium may not hold if: (a) most 
women have incomes exceeding the threshold incomes to rear children; (b) Men in the 
lower portion of income distribution have relatively low incomes; (c) Women are more 
numerous than men. Willis also developed an “Underclass Equilibrium” in which he 
showed that it is possible that a man could find it advantageous to father children at zero 
cost by multiple women in a world where women outnumber men. According to this 
model, higher male incomes tend to strengthen traditional marriage but higher female 
incomes will weaken traditional marriage because it reduces women’s dependency on 
men’s resources. Thus, better economic opportunities for women in the labor market will 
encourage out-of-wedlock childbearing.  
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Edlund and Pande (2000), and Edlund (1998) derived a model by assuming that 
women are vested with custodial rights to their children. Marriage is considered a trade 
in custody from the mother to the father and men acquire these rights by compensating 
women. They suggested that the rise in non-marital fertility is mainly due to the increase 
in female earnings relative to men, which discourages female demand for marriage. 
Akerlof, Yellen and Katz (1996) adopted a quite different point of view to 
address the question. They considered a technological shock, the innovation and 
prevalence of abortion and contraception, as the major reason for a higher out-of-
wedlock birth rate after 1970. A cost-saving innovation or a new technology often harm 
some people and benefit others. After the advent of abortion, women who chose not to 
have an abortion became worse off than women who adopted the new technology 
(abortion). This is because fewer women now ask for a promise of marriage due to 
increasing competition in the marriage market. Akerlof, Yellen and Katz also showed 
that higher female incomes reduce the cost of an out-of-wedlock child. Therefore women 
will tend not to require a marital commitment before sex, which causes a higher chance 
of an out-of-wedlock birth because some women may not choose an abortion in the 
event of a pregnancy. The problem with this hypothesis is that it is hard to discern why 
there are significant differences in out-of-wedlock childbearing among different 
nationalities, despite the fact that most industrialized countries also faced the same 
technological shock during the period, and that many have cultural backgrounds very 
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similar to those of Americans.13 The generic application of the theory to other countries 
seems to be problematic. 
                                                 
13 For example, in 1999, the percentage of births to unwed mothers was less than 10 percent in Switzerland 
and Italy. It was less than 5 percent in Greece and Japan. See Wu and Wolfe (2001). 
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4. A THEORY OF OUT-OF-WEDLOCK CHILDBEARING AND LABOR 
MARKET PROSPECTS 
The results implied by the stylized facts boil down the issue of out-of-wedlock 
childbearing to the decrease in the practice of marriage. It is interesting to explore to 
what extent we observe women who “choose” to move from marital to out-of-wedlock 
childbearing. The first question we have to ask is why two single people would choose 
to marry and whether the declining gains from such a union would result in fewer 
marriages. In general, female labor market participation rates rose by 23 percentage 
points between 1970 and 1995. During the same period, the female-male weekly wage 
ratio for full-time workers increased from 0.56 to 0.72.14 Table 11 shows that over time a 
larger fraction of women who gave birth in the previous year were in the labor force at 
the time of the survey regardless of demographic characteristics. It was more common to 
observe women going back to the work force after having a baby in 2000 than in 1970. 
Moreover, the more schooling a woman attains, the higher the chance she will return to 
work or be actively looking for a job. Both Willis’ and Edlund’s theories imply that 
women obtain financial support from marriage in the presence of children, and 
absolutely or relatively increasing female wages discourage women from marrying. 
However, better labor market opportunities cannot be the only explanation for the higher 
out-of-wedlock ratio because we observe that out-of-wedlock childbearing is still more 
concentrated among lower-income and poorly-educated women.  
                                                 
14 See Blau (1998) 
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Willis pointed out that the rise of wage inequality for men during the past two 
decades also increased the shortage of available men, especially for the low income 
group. Less skilled male labors earn relatively meager wages and the lack of eligible 
men is a key factor in interpreting the drastic decline in marriage in the less educated 
group. Additionally, the changing selection criterion for men in choice of spouse also 
plays an essential role in strengthening the effect of the shrinking pool for low income 
women. A more positively assorted marriage market on economic success increases the 
likelihood of being single for economically disadvantaged women. The purpose of this 
section is to show the connection between the assortative mating marriage market and 
potential spouses’ labor market prospects. In a marriage market where men and women 
with fewer labor market prospects become less desirable, increased homogeneity of 
wages between spouses should be observed.  
The simple model introduced here is adapted from Lam (1988) and Neal (2004), 
and is closely related to Willis (1999). We assume every woman has three alternatives: 
They can choose to be single without children, single with children, or married with 
children. Married without children is not considered here.15 Women with income greater 
than a threshold will be able to have a child using their own resources. Without 
marriage, a woman’s (f) fertility choice can be illustrated by the following optimization 
problem. 
                                                 
15 The majority of married couples will have children sooner or later. In Table 9, we show that the 
percentage of women aged 18-44 yet to have a child has been consistently between 16~19 percent over the 
last three decades. 
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where q is the collective good-child service, T is total available hours, lf  is woman’s 
time spent in home production, lm  is man’s time spent in home production and is zero 
here, wf  is the wage rate, kf is nonlabor income when single (including public 
assistance), G is units of a good purchased in the market to produce the collective good, 
and c is individual f’s consumption of the private good. )(⋅F  is the household production 
function for quality of children. 
Here individuals have the transferable utility function form suggested by 
Bergstom and Cornes (1983) to avoid problems of distribution. Throughout this section, 
we assume the production function of child quality, ),,( GllF mf , exhibits constant 
returns to scale with convex technology. Given input prices, cost minimization implies a 
set of input coefficients, tf, tm, and g, that give the minimum cost way to produce one unit 
of the collective good. tf, tm, and g represent the input coefficients of using wife’s time, 
husband’s time and the good purchased from the market respectively. Therefore, a well-
defined shadow price of the collective good, gptwtw gmmff ++=π , is implied. In a 
single-headed family, lm is restricted to be zero. If lm=0, gptw gff +=π . The budget 
constraint can then be expressed as fff kTwcq +=+π . 
In the case that q is a normal good, women with a wage, w, greater than a 
threshold wage, w*, will choose q>0, where 
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If kf  is considered to be public assistance, like AFDC, then an increase in welfare 
benefits will decrease the threshold wage rate and increase the likelihood of having 
children. For a single woman, the fertility decision depends on whether her wage rate 
exceeds the threshold wage.    
Now consider the possibility of forming a combined household through marriage. 
The gains from marriage are based on both joint production of the collective good, and 
specialization and exchange. Women, f, and men, m, face the following joint utility 
maximization problem:     
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                 (3) 
where Vh represents the joint indirect utility function, and n  represents the fixed cost of 
forming a marriage. Without marriage costs, individuals are always better off if paternity 
is established.16 The last constraint indicates the minimum utility level to attract her 
partner to have children with her. Since )(⋅F  is convex in inputs, this implies the well-
defined shadow price of child quality in the intact family, '''' gptwtw gmmff ++=π , is not 
                                                 
16 It is a pareto-improvement when paternity is established and children enjoy more resources. See Willis 
(1999) for details.  
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larger than the price, gptw gff +=π , in the single-headed family. tf’, tm’ and g’ are the 
input coefficients to produce one unit of q in the intact family.  
The utility maximization problem can also be expressed as the following: 
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where hfV  is the indirect utility function for the wife.  
Lam (1988) shows the following results: 
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where Sf is the wife’s market labor hours. 
m
f
fmmf
h
w
t
AqD
w
q
w
q
ww
V
∂
∂−−∂
∂
∂
∂=∂∂
∂ '
)(
2
 
= collective good effect + specialization effect        (6) 
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D is a combination of terms and is strictly negative by second order condition. 
Becker (1973) shows that 
mf
h
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V
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 indicates positive or negative assortative 
mating if potential spouses differ only in wages. If the first term in equation (6), the 
collective good effect, is positive and dominating, positive assortative mating on wages 
will be observed. If we observe more women are interested in developing their careers, 
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,in other words, there is less substitution between spouses’ time in the production of the 
collective good (the second term in equation (6) is smaller), then we should observe 
more positive assortative mating on wages in the marriage market. Furthermore, the 
gains from an increase in female wages for those women in a two-person family should 
exceed the gains for those women in a single family provided that the spouse’s wage is 
not too low. Equivalently, 
ff
f
f
f
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f
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, conditional on equation (6) being 
positive and women acquiring the total gains from the increase in female wages.17  
  When female labor market participation is improved and average wages are 
increased, it is more likely that w>w*. More women meet the wage threshold and can 
raise children on their own. 
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 There are also more potential gains from marriage when the income inflow from 
the husband is greater than the cost of forming a marriage. An increase in the cost of 
forming a marriage will discourage marriage. In other words, even though a woman may 
be able to raise children solely using her own resources, she may still desire marriage if 
marriage will raise her utility. As shown in Willis (1999) and Neal (2004), the model 
also predicts that public assistance to unwed mothers fosters out-of-wedlock 
childbearing.  
Equation (6) can also be applied to men and implies that men’s decision of who 
to marry depends on the gains from division of labor and joint production of the 
collective good. A low degree of substitution between the husband and the wife enhances 
the possibility of positive assortative mating and implies the gains from specialization 
are of less consideration. If the marriage market exhibits more positive assortative 
mating on wages – high-wage men tend to marry high-wage women – it is more difficult 
for women with relatively low wages to marry with a high wage-earning man. Women 
with relatively low wages have a disadvantage in competing with women with high labor 
market prospects. Lower-wage women are less desirable and can only attract lower-wage 
men. Over the last four decades, the labor force participation rate of less-educated men 
and the proportion of those who were full-time and full-year workers both declined. 
Equation (3) demonstrates that if women’s share of the cost of marriage exceeds the 
potential income inflow due to no/low male wages or no/low participation in the labor 
market, and men increasingly select their spouses based on female labor market 
prospects, we will see more unwed childbearing in the lower part of the wage 
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distribution. To some extent, this is similar to what Wilson (1987) described as the 
predicament of the shortage of eligible men in the underclass. The lack of eligible men is 
already a serious problem for less-educated women and black society. A changing 
attitude that places more emphasis on economic success would further deteriorate the 
marriage market for women in this group. Men and women at lower education levels 
would fare worse and be less likely to get married. As a result, out-of-wedlock 
childbearing behavior will become more common among lower-wage women.  
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5. MARITAL DECISIONS AND THE CHANGES IN THE LABOR MARKET 
5.1. Female Labor Force Participation and Participation-related Behaviors 
In this section we provide an overview of the important trends and patterns in 
female labor force participation or participation-related behaviors over the period 1960 
to 2000. Regardless of the measure used, there is no doubt that the United States has 
experienced a substantial rise in the female labor force participation. 74 percent of 
women ages 25-54 were in the labor force and 70 percent were employed during the last 
week at the turn of the century. Table 12 presents trends in female labor force 
participation rates by social and demographic groups. The level of female participation 
in the labor force is positively related to education level, which is consistent with 
standard human capital theory. Participation rates have risen over the period across 
different education, race, age and region groups. While participation rose for all, the 
increase is more pronounced for higher-educated women and remains robust after the 
change in the demographic distribution is considered. The pace of the change has slowed 
since 1990.  
Figures 5a and 5b provide companion information to the tables by showing the 
overall trends in participation from a cohort perspective. The more recent cohorts have 
shown a sharp rise in labor force attachment relative to the older cohorts. Note that 
participation in general increases with age within specific cohorts, except maybe women 
in their childbearing years. The “fertility dip”, however, has disappeared gradually 
across younger cohorts. For cohorts born after 1950, the decline in employment during 
the childbearing years is not obvious relative to their predecessors. For working women, 
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the lifecycle work weeks in the previous year are also higher among more recent cohorts. 
Women in their childbearing years are less a factor for fewer work weeks for more 
recent cohorts.  
Alongside the increase in participation, the marriage rate has declined and a 
growing number of women are single. Table 13 provides the detailed information on 
labor force attachment by current marital status. Note that the intensity of female labor 
supply has increased both in intensive and extensive margin. In particular, the increase 
mostly came from currently married women. The fraction of working women, 
conditional on currently married, accelerated throughout the period and married women 
tended to work more weeks once they entered the labor market. For married women who 
were employed, they worked almost as much as single women in 2000. The working 
patterns for single women vary little over the period. It is no longer normal for women to 
stay out of the labor force after marriage. The notable leap in average annual hours of 
work among working women from 1980 to 1990 is mainly caused by the increase in the 
average weeks of work in the previous year.18 
Table 14 traces the average work weeks of current married participants and non-
participants by education separately for men and women. The percentage of women and 
men worked full-year is also included in the table. This table indicates that the currently 
married men and women display disparate working behaviors over time. Married 
women’s labor supply has increased drastically, but the male labor supply has dropped 
                                                 
18 Due to changes in survey questions over time, we are not able to compute measures of hours of work 
based on one single common question for the entire period. Since hours of work last week is an essential 
piece of information to impute the usual hours of work prior to 1970, we include women who worked both 
in the previous year and in the previous week to make a consistent comparison across year. 
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slightly and shows no sign of change for college men. The increase in female 
employment has been greatest for higher-educated women, while the decline in male 
employment has been largest for less-educated men. This is consistent with Juhn and 
Murphy (1997), in which they found no evidence of the speculation that married women 
have increased their labor supply to compensate for the loss in their husbands’ earnings. 
Although, in general, women with young children are less likely to work relative 
to women without children, the proportion of working mothers has increased and the 
average weeks they worked has also increased across cohorts. Figures 6a and 6b 
compare the participation rates and average weeks of work between women with 
children and women without children under age 6. The ratios are negatively related to 
the age given any cohort since higher-educated women tend to have children at older 
ages and they are more likely to stay in the labor force and work more. The ratios are 
expected to be greatest in the childbearing years within specific cohorts, yet the 
difference between women with and without young children is getting smaller across 
cohorts and the ratios are relatively constant for younger cohorts as they aged. 
The number of children is anticipated to have a negative impact on female 
participation. Table 15 reports the trends in average number of children ever had for 
women aged 25-44 and the percentage who were childless separately by two age groups. 
After peaking in 1970, the average number of children began to fall until l990. The 
average number of children in 1990 doesn’t deviate from the number in 2000. Women 
with high education are associated with higher opportunity cost of rearing children. It is 
no surprise that the more educated the women, the fewer children they have as shown in 
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the table. The number of children ever born for women age 35-44 has shifted to fewer 
children or no children. The fraction of high school dropout women without children 
remains stable and fluctuates around 10 percent. College graduates are most likely to 
have no children. 28 percent of college women aged 35-44 had no children and only 5 
percent of them had more than four children in 2000.  
Figures 7a and 7b plot the percentage of women aged 35-44 in the labor force 
and percentage of them who worked last week respectively by number of children and 
education. For women, the number of children is negatively associated with the 
likelihood of working as expected. Generally women without children tend to be 
currently working except for high school dropout women. Childless women without a 
high school degree appear less likely to work than women with one or two children 
especially for post-1980 period. Conditional on the number of children women ever had, 
participation rates have increased throughout most of the period and slowed after 1990. 
The fraction of women who worked presents similar patterns despite the fact that the 
trend shows signs of a reverse for college women in 2000.19 
While the number of children is positively related to the likelihood of being 
currently married, the likelihood for women with two children is essentially not that 
different from those with more than two children, as indicated in Figure 8a and 8b. The 
probability of being married has declined conditional on the number of children across 
education over time. However, the slopes of the decline given the number of children 
                                                 
19 Due to various data sources; numbers in 2000 from June CPS and the rest of figures from Census, we 
are cautious about the implication. 
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become flatter as the education level increases regardless of race, and the slopes even 
turn positive for white college graduates after 1980. An implication of these changes is 
either college graduates are more likely to marry or less likely to divorce in the presence 
of children over time. A noticeable difference is observed between white and black 
women. Black women are significantly less likely to be currently married relative to 
whites given the same number of children.  
Figures 9a and 9b juxtapose the trends in the labor market and marriage market 
for women separately by the presence of children under age 5 in the family. The figures 
show that the increase in female labor market participation is larger for higher-educated 
women and the decrease in marriage is more serious for less-educated women over the 
period. The trend is even more remarkable for women with young children in the family. 
While younger college women seem to be able to achieve both family and career at the 
same time, which is consistent with Goldin’s (2004) finding, less-educated women are 
more likely to stay single and not employed relative to college graduates. To some 
extent, this corresponds to Wilson’s (1987) popular book. Economically disadvantaged 
groups are “truly disadvantaged” in all aspects. 
 Tables 16a and 16b report the supporting information to Figure 9. It outlines the 
result using logit regression in order to control for the changes in the demographic 
distribution jointly. We obtain the values by first running separate logit regression using 
samples from 1960 and 2000 to get the estimated coefficients and predicted values. Then 
we apply the data from 2000 using the coefficients estimating from the 1960’s sample 
and compute the imputed predicted values. After taking the difference between the 
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imputed predicted values and actual predicted values using the sample from 2000, we 
sum up separately each of the four education groups and report the final results in the 
first column in Table 16a. Specifically, we first compute the difference for each 
individual i in the education j: )ˆ()ˆ( 19602000,20002000, ββ iiij xxd Λ−Λ= . 2000βˆ  is the vector of 
estimated coefficients using the sample from 2000, xi is the vector of individual i’s 
characteristics, and )ˆ( 20002000, βixΛ  is the predicted probability of being currently married 
for individual i in 2000. Likewise, 1960βˆ and )ˆ( 19601960, βixΛ  represent the vector of 
estimated coefficients and predicted probability using data from 1960. Applying the data 
from 2000 and using the coefficients estimated from the 1960’s sample would get the 
predicted values : )ˆ( 19602000, βixΛ . After computing the differences, we then add up the 
differences separately with respect to the four education groups and obtain the values: 
ij
i
d∑  . Similarly, we could work in the opposite direction: use the sample in 2000 as a 
baseline model and predict the propensity to marry using the data in 1960. That is, we 
compute these values: )ˆ()ˆ(' 19601960,20001960, ββ iiij xxd Λ−Λ=   and then sum up separately 
by the four education levels. Results are reported in the second column. Comparing 1960 
to 2000, the table demonstrates that with the overall drop in the marriage rate, college 
women is the group with the closest values between the imputed predicted probabilities 
of being currently married and actual predicted ones. This implies that college women 
with similar demographic characteristics are most likely to be currently married both in 
1960 and 2000. In contrast, women with less education are more likely to marry in 1960 
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than their counterparts in 2000. Instead of current marital status, the same approach 
could be utilized again in terms of current working status and the main results are shown 
in Table 16b. Interestingly, alongside the overall rise in the participation rate, women 
with less than a high school degree is the group with the closest values between the 
imputed predicted probabilities of being in the labor force and actual predicted ones. 
This indicates that with the overall rise in female labor force participation, less-educated 
women participated less increasingly relative to women with at least a high school 
degree. In a nutshell, less-educated women contribute more to the decline in marriage 
and contribute less to the increase in participation, which is consistent with the visual 
conception from Figure 9. 
The wage rate is an important indicator of potential gain to market employment 
and affects a series of decisions ranging from marriage and fertility to bargaining power 
within the family (Blau 1998). Figure 10a and 10b present trends in real average and 
median weekly wages across education groups as well as providing information on the 
education-premium as we make a comparison on the basis of one specific education 
group. The changes in real weekly wages for high school dropouts or high school 
graduates are quite limited relative to the increases for college graduates. College 
graduate workers have enjoyed a substantial growth in real wages over the period. Taken 
together, the education premium has increased since 1960 (even with a small dip in 
1980) regardless of gender (Deere and Vesovic 2006). As a result, the economic 
prospects for college graduates are further improved relative to individuals without 
college degrees. It is worth noting that together with a considerable growth in 
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participation, women with a college education have experienced faster growth in real 
wages. This implies that the increase in female labor supply at higher education levels 
comes hand-in-hand with improving opportunities in the labor market.  
The female-male wage ratio is a prominent factor in interpreting the decisions 
between the marriage and labor market. A higher wage ratio represents more returns 
from the labor market and higher opportunity cost of time for non-market activities. 
Weekly gender wage ratios for the at least ‘part-time’ and ‘part-year’ workers by 
education and separately by two age categories are reported in Table 17. 20 Despite a 
widening difference in weekly wage rates between men and women from 1960 to 1980, 
the overall gender wage difference has shrunk from 1960 to 2000. Women at younger 
ages 25-34 narrow the gap additionally with their male counterpart. The trends in 
female-male relative wage ratios are somewhat different for various education and race 
groups. For the younger age group in most cases, college graduates have the smallest 
gender wage gap and the gap is smaller among blacks. As a matter of fact, the wage 
disparity between black male and female college graduates is quite minor relative to that 
of whites. For all women, due to the fact that the increase in wage growth is smaller for 
older women, the pattern is less transparent for whites but remains true for blacks. 
Regarding the change of pace over time, the difference in wages is narrower as a whole. 
The growth rates in the gender wage ratios are negatively correlated with education level, 
and female high school dropouts have the most substantial growth. In contrast, we 
observe that the female-male wage ratios decrease slightly for black college graduates 
                                                 
20 For the full description of the definition, see footnote in Table 6. 
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and only increase slightly for whites. The variation in gender wage ratios over the period 
is crucial in explaining the change in the recent marriage market.  
5.2. The Declining Gain from Marriage and Gender Wage Gap 
In Becker’s (1973) classic paper, the gains from marriage come solely from 
specialization and marriage will be of greatest advantage for couples with the largest 
wage difference. An increase in female wages relative to male wages should decrease 
the gains from marriage if the female wage rate is less than the male wage rate. Using 
Lam’s setup as we introduced previously, we should reach similar results. A rise in 
female or male wages has a positive effect on marital utility as seen in equation (5). The 
impact on marital utility of a rise in female and male wage rates by the same proportion, 
however, is ambiguous. The total marital income increases as well as the shadow price 
of child service, and thus the joint utility in the family may increase or decrease 
depending on the change of magnitude in wages and production technology. 
A rise in the female wage rate along with the amount of drop in male wage rate 
which keeps the full income in the family unchanged will increase the shadow price of 
the child service when men spend more time in the market than women. Thus, the total 
marital utility falls and the incentive for women to marry decreases. It is less clear for 
men since the single utility is lower in the meantime. The logic behind this can be 
derived from the simple model we used. Recall that marital indirect utility Vh is a 
function of the shadow price of child service, ),,( gfm pwwπ , and full income, 
)( fm wwTI += . The shadow price of child service is the average cost function to 
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produce one unit of child service owing to the assumption that production function of 
child service is constant returns to scale. The price of the private good is set to one as 
numeraire. The effect on the unit cost function ),,( gfm pwwπ of the change in wf  and 
wm  holding  pg  constant is equal to 
=πd m
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Thus fmff dwldwld +=π . A set of wage changes from a rise in wf with a drop in wm 
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If men spend more hours in the market than women, the unit cost or the shadow price of 
child service is higher for the change in wages with total marital income fixed. In other 
words, marital utility will decrease with regard to the change. For females, marriage 
becomes less attractive because the expected marital utility is lower and single utility 
(the reservation price to marry) is greater. Note that the total gain from marriage is the 
difference between marital utility and combined utility of two individuals. That is,  
)( fs
m
sh VVVG +−=  
where msV and 
f
sV are the male and female utility if each are single.  
Recall that m
m
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and msq  are the optimal amount of child service that single woman and man would 
choose. With the change in wages holding marital income constant, the change of 
combined single utility of a man and woman is: 
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The change in the combined single utility would be equal to zero if the man and woman 
choose the same amount of the child service in the single state. It implies that the total 
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gains from marriage decline. Furthermore, it is more plausible that ms
f
s qq >  or even 
0=msq  when the man is single, and hence the gains from marriage would further 
decline. Fewer marriages should be formed in the entire marriage market.   
Ceteris paribus, a narrower wage gap between the man and woman reduces the 
total utility from marriage if the husband’s wage rate is higher than the wife’s and the 
husband spends more labor hours in the market than the wife. The intuition is that the 
increase in marital utility arising out of an increase in the wife’s wages is smaller than 
the reduction in marital utility arising from the  reduction in the husband’s wages if the 
husband works at least as much as the wife. When there is a smaller disparity between 
male and female wage rate before the change, the change in the relative wage ratio 
causes modest potential losses from marriage. In a case where female wages are the 
same as male wages, male and female time are perfect substitutes and there is no gain 
from specialization in marriage; the loss would minimal. In addition, if women work as 
much as men, there is no effect on marital utility from the change in their relative wages. 
We use a simple framework similar to Freiden’s (1974) to explain the change in 
the marriage market. A rational individual decides to marry when the gains from 
marriage exceed the gains from not marrying. That is, individual mi will marry  fi  if 
mi
s
mi
h VV ≥  and fisfih VV ≥ . By ordering various male single utilities, misV , the supply 
curve of men in the marriage market is essentially the cumulative distribution of men 
with respect to misV . Likewise, the supply curve of women is the cumulative distribution 
of the fisV . Recall that 
w
h
m
hh VVV +=  or whhmh VVV −= . The supply of women is 
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negatively related to the male marital utility, mihV , and can be considered as the derived 
demand for husbands by women. Therefore, the demand curve has an intercept, 
)min( fih VV − , and is negatively sloped. 21 In Figure 11 in equilibrium E, the proportion 
of women ffh NN /  marry to the proportion of men 
mm
h NN /  and acquire the 
utilities mhh
f
h VVV −= . Here fN  is the total number of women which is set initially 
equal to the total number of men mN . A rise in wf  relative to wm  reduces the gains from 
marriage and shifts the demand curve for husbands to the left. In Figure 11, the demand 
curve shifts from D0 to D1 and the market reaches the new equilibrium E1. The number 
of marriages in equilibrium declines and the proportion of men and women married will 
be lower and equal ffh NN /' =
mm
h NN /' . The rise in female wages without significant 
increase in martial incomes is more prevalent in the marriage market at lower education 
levels where male wages are relatively low and sluggish to grow. What’s more, when 
growing unemployment rates dampen the average quality of potential men in the pool, 
the derived demand for husbands will be even lower and the demand curve will move 
further to the left.  
The cost of forming a marriage is another critical factor affecting the marital 
decision. The larger the cost, the less gain the couple can share and the less incentive to 
marry for both. It is possible that the changes in cost of marriage either affect one partner 
or have greater impact on one partner. One of the roles of marriage is that women 
exchange custodial right of children for financial resources (Edlund 1998). Since 1970, 
                                                 
21 For details, see Freiden (1974). 
   
 
40
the general guide for the court’s decision about physical custody has moved from 
favoring mothers to the parent with whom it is in the children’s “best interest” to reside 
(Buehler and Gerard 1995). Women may be concerned that they are more likely to lose 
custody of their children in the event of divorce and thus the implicit cost of marriage is 
higher; this weakens women’s demand for marriage and moves the demand curve to the 
left.  
Burdett and Coles (1997) consider a matching model and provide a proof that in 
rational steady state equilibrium, the marriage market would be sorted into independent 
classes according to singles’ traits. It is optimal for women in one class to select men 
only from the other class. In the previous section, we showed that both men and women 
are increasingly inclined to select their spouse based on the spouse’s economic potential. 
Consequently, the marriage market becomes more positively assorted and women with 
fewer labor market prospects would only select husbands with low economic potential. 
By construction, the expected average male wages are lower for women at lower 
education levels when the marriage market is partitioned into smaller units and men and 
women become more alike.22 Also in Table 6, we observe that the greatest growth in the 
female-male wage ratio occurred in the case of less-educated women. Women with 
college degrees, however, experienced the lowest growth and even negative growth for 
black women. When female real wages at lower education levels increase relative to 
those of males at similar education levels, the benefit from marriage declines and the 
                                                 
22 The interaction between marriage assortative mating and income inequality has been examined in some 
studies. See Fernandez, Guner and Knowles (2001) for example. 
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income for women increases. Marriages become less attractive and an increasing number 
of marriages formed by men and women from the lower part of the education 
distribution become more marginal. In other words, the marriages between low educated 
men and women are less likely to happen and more likely to end with a divorce. 
Marriages at higher education levels, by contrast, are not as shaky as those at low 
education levels. On one hand, the gains from specialization in marriage may decline, 
but do not decline as much as marriages at lower education levels. On the other hand, 
individuals select partners based on their labor market prospects and marriages at high 
education levels still gain from joint consumption of the collective goods. This explains 
why we observe the negative association between the fraction of currently married 
individuals and their education. 
As women’s current or future position in the labor market has become more 
important in the marriage market, women would be more willing to invest in education 
than traditional human capital aiming at domestic production. Women with high 
education have the tendency to participate in the labor market and work more due to the 
higher opportunity cost of not working. Recent improvements for women in the working 
environment should further remove some barriers against working. For married women, 
the own price effect implies the increase in female wages would decrease the time 
women spend on non-market activities and increase their labor hours in the market by 
the basic cost minimization problem in household production. Couples with high 
education tend to consume less child service and substitute market goods with their time. 
As a result, we would not expect that college women would leave the labor force or 
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work less after marriage. Alternatively, women with low education may or may not find 
a partner and marry, and even when they are married, they are more likely to stay at 
home because of relatively low wages. It is less costly for them to stay at home and take 
care of children. 
One of the implications of an increased emphasis on women’s economic 
characteristics in the marriage market is the postponement of their marriage until their 
economic potential is revealed. Due to higher female wages, women with more 
economic potential tend to search longer in the market to find an acceptable match. For 
women with low labor market prospects, they have a lower reservation price for 
marriage and would accept the offer to marry once a marginal man proposes. As a result, 
marriages at lower education levels will be formed at early ages but with more 
instability.23 Moreover, the improvement of women’s labor market position decreases 
the comparative gains from marriage and increases the likelihood to divorce. In 
particular, if male real wages decrease and the unemployment rate increases, the wives 
have less to lose and have less incentive to maintain the union. Less educated women are 
expected to marry at younger ages, but since these marriages are relatively marginal, 
they are less likely to be currently married after a certain age. The theory implies college 
women are still more likely to marry despite the fact that they get married at a later age.  
Another implication of the theory concerns local marriage market differences. 
Gender wage gaps should be negatively associated with the degree of positive 
                                                 
23 Some studies from United States have shown that an inverse association between spouses’ levels of 
education and the risk of divorce. Most studies also found the older the couples were at the time of first 
marriage, the less likely they are to divorce. See Tzeng (1992) for example. 
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assortative mating in the local marriage market. The more prevalence of intereducational 
or heterogamous marriages will be observed in regions with a wider gender wage gap. In 
areas where men and women have more equal positions, we would observe higher 
similarity of economic success between spouses.  
Following Becker’s (1965) pioneering work, most of the studies in the literature 
illustrating the relationship between fertility and female labor supply in the intact family 
use the household production and time allocation model.24 According to the previous 
discussion, there is a strong negative correlation between the presence of young children 
in the family and female labor supply regardless of the measures used. The impact of an 
increase in female wage rates on fertility depends on the substitution and income effect. 
The mainstream view is the substitution effect, which is associated with a higher cost of 
female time, dominates the income effect given the assumption that childrearing is 
relatively time intensive. 25 Women tend to have fewer children when market labor is 
more rewarding. In Lam’s model, the change of female wages with respect to child 
service in the household can be decomposed as: 
I
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f ∂
∂+−
−=∂
∂                                                           (9) 
where )( mf wwTI +=  is the couple’s full income. The first term on the right side is the 
substitution effect and is negative. The second term is the pure income effect and is 
positive if child service is a normal good. We should observe a stronger substitution 
                                                 
24 A thorough survey is provided by Hotz, Klerman and Willis (1997).  
25 See Schultz (1994, 1997) 
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when child service is more time intensive, i.e. tf is larger. Be aware that here the child 
service is not necessarily equivalent to the number of children. It is out of the scope of 
this paper to discuss the relationship between child service and number of children even 
though we believe they should be positively correlated. 
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6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS: POSITIVE ASSORTATIVE MARRIAGE MARKET 
AND ITS IMPACT 
6.1. Are Couples More Positively Assorted than Before? 
In most of the literature, the concept of positive assortative mating on a specific 
characteristic means that individuals tend to match or marry someone with that same 
characteristic. Most studies related to assortative mating patterns have focused on 
educational attainment. Mare (1991) found the association between spouses’ schooling 
increased between 1930 and 1970. Adjusting the data for the length of time between 
leaving school and marriage, some evidence of increased homogamy (couples in the 
same educational category) remained from the 1930s to the 1980s. Kalmijn (1991) used 
a set of different data sources covering the period from 1955 to 1989 to show that 
marriages have become increasingly homogamous with respect to education using a 
multivariate loglinear analysis. Pencavel (1998) separated white women aged 25-34 and 
their spouses into five schooling levels and showed that spouses become more similar in 
their schooling background between 1960 and 1990. Expanding Pencavel’s analysis with 
census data for 2000, and using the same target group, the trend of increased homogamy 
is sustained. The odds ratio of the wife and husband having the same educational level 
increased from 1.0 in 1990 to 1.1 in 2000.26 The odds of being married to someone 
whose schooling differs by at most one level has also risen from 7.2 in 1990 to 8.3 in 
2000.27 Details are given in Table 18. 
                                                 
26 Pencavel (1998) reports the odds ratio is 1.03 in 1990. 
27 Pencavel’s number is 8.62 in 1990. 
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If one thinks schooling level is a good indicator of wages, then there is some 
evidence of positive assortative mating over the period. However, if one considers 
education too coarse to accurately represent wages, or if couples with more similar 
schooling backgrounds only represent preferences for similar life styles as opposed to 
income levels, then we have to examine wages per se. The problem with wages is that 
we do not observe the actual wage rate for individuals who did not work in the market. 
This problem is more serious for women. Examining only the correlation of wages for 
couples who both work creates a selection bias since we tend to sample those women 
with higher wages. Becker (1973) argued this bias is the reason we observe positive 
association of wages between spouses. To circumvent the problem, we follow the 
standard Heckman two-step approach to impute the wages for those who did not report 
their wages, or reported their hourly wage rate as lower than half of the minimum hourly 
wage rate in that year.28  The analysis is based on the 1/100 Samples of the U.S. Census 
from 1960 to 2000. The data are restricted to individuals who are white or black and 
currently married with spouse present. The sample is further restricted to individuals 
with potential experience between 1 and 40 years to predict wages. Students, the self-
employed and unpaid family workers are excluded from the sample. We run separate 
regressions for white and black individuals. Specifically, we do this by first estimating a 
                                                 
28 We don’t use the wages that are lower than half of the minimum hourly wage rate in order to lessen the 
effect of measurement errors. The hourly wage rate is defined as total wage and salary income last year 
divided by the product of the weeks worked last year and usual hours worked per week. Weeks worked in 
the previous year were also imputed from the relationship by race, sex, potential experience and education 
between detailed and interval measures of weeks worked in the previous year in 1980.The usual hours  
worked per week were imputed for years prior to 1970 using CPS March data with regard to additional 
information about part-time or full time workers last year.  
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probit regression over the full sample of wives, considering their labor force 
participation choice with a set of variables that affect the decision. The regressors 
include age, its quadratic to quartic, schooling level, region dummies, the presence of 
children under 5, and nonwife income. Nonwife income is equal to the sum of a 
husband’s earnings and a wife’s earnings, minus the wife’s labor income. We use the 
computed inverse Mills’ ratio to correct the wage equation with the logarithm of wages 
for the working wives in the second step. The explanatory variables in the wage equation 
include age, its quadratic to quartic, schooling level and region dummies. The estimated 
coefficients are then used to predict wages for nonworking or very low-wage wives. 
Similarly, we also impute the logarithm of hourly wage rates for men with zero or low 
wages.29  
With the full sample of spouse-present couples with actual or imputed logarithm 
of hourly wages, we are able to analyze the association of wages between the spouses. In 
order to make consistent comparisons among different years, the disturbances sampling 
with replacement from the actual residual wages with the same educational level, age 
and geographic region are added to the predicted wages for nonworking or very low-
wage husbands and wives. The sample is limited to spouses where the husband is not 
more than fifteen years older or more than ten years younger than his wife to prevent the 
occurrence of mismatch in the census data. To avoid the selection bias of choosing 
couples married at early ages across time, different age ranges are selected in the sample 
                                                 
29 We use husband’s nonlabor income in the husband’s participation choice estimation. We leave out 
wife’s nonlabor income.  
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for different census years. Women aged 25-50 in 1960, 26-51 in 1970, 27-52 in 1980, 
28-53 in 1990 and analogously 29-54 in 2000 are selected for the sample. Summary 
statistics are provided in Table 19. The years of schooling increased across race and 
gender over time. The percentage of couples with children under 5 years old declined 
partly because married women’s fertility rates decreased and partly because of the 
sample selection scheme we adopted. The decreasing proportion of imputed female 
wages over time is due to growing female labor market participation. The relatively high 
proportion of imputed male wages in 1960 and 1970 results from the higher fraction of 
men who earned less than half of the hourly minimum wage in the earlier years. The 
mean black wives’ logarithmic hourly wages are quite close to those of white wives’ 
after 1980, which is an indication of the selection bias of black women with high wages. 
Since individuals are likely to choose a partner with a similar age in a similar 
geographic region, a contaminated result may be obtained if one simply examines the 
correlation of wages between the spouses. To obtain a partial correlation between 
spouses’ wage while controlling for other traits, the following regressions are considered: 
mmffmmm dummiesregionaldageageageagewage εββββα +∗+++++= 243221log  
ffffmmf dummiesregionaldageageageagewage εββββα ++++++= *log 243221  
where subscripts m , f denote men (husband) and women (wife) respectively. We 
introduce the quadratic age term in the equation to take into account the idea that 
individuals   may   select   their   spouses   based   on   spouses’   position   on   the   age  
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profile.30 
The correlation between the residual wages is the main focus for our analysis. As 
addressed in the beginning of this section, if schooling level is considered as an indicator 
of similar life style or taste, then education should be included in the regression. 
However, suppose that years of schooling is a strong indicator of an individual’s 
potential in the labor market, and then any control for education is not appropriate and 
should not be included in the regression as it would bias the results. The results of both 
specifications with and without the control for education are reported in Table 20. Both 
husbands’ and wives’ schooling level dummies are included in the regression in the case 
of control for education. 
Table 20 reports the coefficients of correlation between spouses’ wages, 
controlling for other traits. The coefficients are positive across all years and races. This 
implies that husbands’ wages are positively related to wives’ wages in all years. Our 
finding is consistent with most of the literature and suggests that there is positive 
assortative mating on wages in the U.S. over the period in question. Notice that even 
though the coefficients are smaller, the positive association does not change after we 
control for education levels. On top of that, the coefficients for blacks are larger than 
                                                 
30 Bergstrom and Bagnoli (1993) argue that the reason for the consistent age gap between spouses in most 
countries and across time is because women select their partners according to their prospects or potential 
in the labor market. So women are more inclined to choose a partner when his future economic success is 
revealed. If men searching for partners also place more emphasis on economic potential, then it is 
foreseeable that women will delay their marriage until their economic desirability is revealed. This implies 
that the age difference at first marriage between men and women should narrow. From 1960 to 2000 for 
couples aged 25-54, the age difference is reduced by almost one year for whites and by one and half years 
for blacks.  
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those for whites for 1960-1970. This is in line with Smith’s (1979) analysis that black 
couples were already more positively assorted than whites in the 1960s. It is well known 
that eligible men are relatively scarce in the black marriage market. As a result, black 
men are allowed to be more selective in choosing among potential wives and a more 
positively assorted marriage market is expected.  
The coefficients of correlation in 2000 are higher than those in 1960 across races 
and regardless of whether education is controlled for or not. This demonstrates that 
wages between spouses are more positively related in 2000 than they were in 1960. For 
whites, it is clear that there is an upward trend in positive assortative mating on wages. 
The coefficient in 2000 is more than double without education control and more than 
triple with education control compared to 1960. Although the trend of the assortative 
process for blacks is less clear, all the coefficients in 2000 are greater than those in 1960, 
and there persists an upward trend over the period, although the trend seems to reverse 
after 1990. To some extent, this is related to the fact that the growth of never-married 
motherhood among black women seems to be mitigated in the 1990s (see Table 7). The 
coefficients for blacks, however, are greater than those for whites in most cases and are 
quite close in 2000. Overall black couples are more positively assorted than whites even 
though the two trends converge at the end of the last century.  
The usage of female imputed wages may be problematic due to the relatively 
smaller fraction of women working in the early years of the sample. Instead of the 
correlation between spouses’ wages, we can examine the relationship of wives’ 
education on husbands’ wages over time. If there is an increasing association between 
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male wages and women’s education, we should observe a larger estimated coefficient of 
 wives’ education level on husbands’ wages. Table 21 shows selected results of 
estimated coefficients of wives’ schooling level on husbands’ wages controlling for 
wives’ age, its square, husbands’ age, its square, and geographic region. Both white and 
black men whose spouse is a college graduate have a greater wage premium relative to 
their counterpart whose wife is a high school dropout. The difference between the high 
school dropout wives and wives with at least a college degree increased from 0.29 in 
1960 to 0.52 in 2000 for whites, and 0.32 in 1960 to 0.43 in 2000 for blacks. This 
increase in the difference indicates more positive assortative mating in 2000 than in 1960, 
and is consistent with our previous results.       
To sum up, our result shows increased homogeneity of wages between the wife 
and husband since 1960 regardless of whether schooling is controlled for or not. In 
particular, we observe that there is larger positive correlation in the wages of black 
spouses than in white spouses in the early years. Women with higher wages seem to be 
more favorable for men with higher wages in the marriage market.  
6.2. The Impact of a More Positively Assorted Marriage Market 
After the availability of effective birth control and improved female labor market 
prospects, a sizable proportion of women increased their interest in developing their 
career. 31  As a result, we expect less substitution between the spouses’ time. The 
                                                 
31 Goldin and Katz (2002) explored the relationship between the diffusion of the birth control pill and the 
increase of college women entering professional programs. They found that the pill lowers the costs of 
long-duration professional education for women and women were more likely to have careers. 
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incentive for a man to select a woman with labor market potential is also stronger, and, 
hence, more homogeneity of wages between spouses will be observed. Both men and 
women are looking for someone with high actual or potential wages. During the same 
period, an increasing fraction of women worked for pay while labor demand for less-
skilled workers was weaker than in the 1960s. In 1960, among high school dropouts 
aged 25-34, 95 percent of white men and 90 percent of black men with the same 
education level worked in the previous year. In 2000, only 83 percent of white men and 
59 percent of black men worked in the previous year. The fraction of full-time and full-
year working men has decreased even further.32 For a less-educated woman searching 
for a husband, the problem of a lack of employed or eligible men becomes more serious 
due to a more selective marriage market. Given that some women prefer single 
motherhood over childlessness and more working women are capable of raising a child 
independently, non-married motherhood should increase, especially among women with 
less schooling. It is expected that men and women with fewer labor market prospects 
would also fare worse over time in the marriage market. The trend in Table 22 confirms 
this statement. Each entry in the table represents the ratio of the actual proportion of the 
currently married population relative to the general population categorized by schooling 
level and age. Or: 
                                                 
32 Detailed numbers are illustrated in Appendix B. 
   
 
53
 
ratio=
ji
ji
y
x
,
,
),(
),(
ieducationwithpercentthejgroupageinthoseOf
ieducationwithpercentthejgroupageinandmarriedcurrentlythoseOf=  
where i is : >12, 12, 13-15, or ≥16 years of schooling, and j is age 25-34, 35-44 or 45-
54. Notice that ∑ =
i
jix 1,  and ∑ =
i
jiy 1, . If everyone is currently married, then the ratio 
is equal to 1. Of those in the same age group, a ratio larger than 1 implies the population 
at this schooling level is doing relatively well in marriage compared with other 
educational groups.    
The table indicates that the marriage market is tilted towards more-educated men 
and women over the period. The trend is much more pronounced for blacks. Consider 
black male high school dropouts aged 25-34, the ratio decreases from 0.99 in 1960 to 
0.48 in 2000, a greater than 50 percentage point drop. The ratio for black college 
graduates increased from 1.02 in 1960 to 1.28 in 2000. In contrast, the ratio for white 
male high school dropouts only declined from 0.99 to 0.90. Black high school dropouts 
are increasingly unlikely to be currently married. The less-educated whites fared better 
than their black counterparts mostly because their employment rate was higher. Some 
white women were still willing to marry as long as the cost of forming a marriage was 
not too high. 
In a marriage market where individuals with better labor market prospects are 
more favorable than others, we expect those with less economic success to have more 
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difficulty in finding a match. As a result, a growing positive correlation of wages 
between married spouses should follow. Along with increasing financial independence 
and deteriorating pools of less-educated men, less-educated women with children or 
wanting children are more likely to be single despite the fact that they may prefer to be 
married. Recall that fertility choice (having children or not) is quite constant over the 
period. This explains why single motherhood is still more concentrated among less-
educated and black women. The changing attitude of greater emphasis on labor market 
prospects worsens those women in some sense. A less-educated woman is more likely to 
become a single mother today than her counterpart of forty years ago. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
In the first part of this dissertation, we have attempted to disentangle several 
patterns related to the rise in out-of-wedlock childbearing. Women are not only more 
likely to be single with children but are also more likely to stay single in the event of a 
premarital birth. The decision of non-marrying is strongly associated with labor market 
prospects. Unwed motherhood is still relatively rare among college graduates. The 
introduction of effective birth control pills lowers the cost of investment in education for 
women and increases the likelihood of working in the labor market. This causes the 
gains from specialization and exchange in the family to decline and affects spousal 
selection. Men and women increasingly opt to choose someone with better labor market 
prospects.  
The narrowing gender wage gap reduces the gains from division of labor in the 
household. The effect is more pronounced in lower education groups because of the 
higher growth in the female-male wage ratio. We describe the impact of decreasing gains 
from specialization in marriage and the increasing stress on labor market prospects on 
female labor market participation choices in the second part of this dissertation. College 
women are inclined to develop their careers when they are young, and better economic 
success is advantageous to them in the marriage market as well. This implies a plan: 
“career then marriage” or “career and marriage”. In contrast, we find women at lower 
education levels are at greater risk of single-motherhood and have less labor force 
attachment.  
The data supports the idea that couples are increasingly positively assorted from 
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1960 to 2000. Our results find evidence of an increase over time in the association of 
husbands’ wages with wives’ wages or education. The declining fraction of employed 
and working full-time, full-year men, especially for less-educated and black men, 
reinforces the worsening plight of women with less schooling. Women perhaps are not 
any less willing to marry than forty years ago, but they stay single because they can’t 
find a qualified partner. For those women who prefer to be single mothers rather than 
childless or who are more concerned about the costs associated with the dissolution of 
marriage, they are more likely to have kids and stay single or wait for an eligible partner 
to marry. 
From a policy perspective, our findings may point out why most studies about 
welfare benefits have found either no effect or a very small effect on single motherhood. 
Welfare benefits may lower the threshold for women while single. Nonetheless, the main 
reason for single motherhood results from the disadvantage of competitive position in 
the marriage market for those women with lower wages and the shrinking pool of 
potential partners. Stricter requirements on welfare or less public assistance would make 
those single mothers worse off. More recently, Joyce, Kaestner and Koreman (2002) 
examined the influence of the welfare reform of 1996, Personal Responsibility Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), on non-marital fertility. They found very 
little evidence for an effect on out-of-wedlock childbearing. This suggests that the 
policymakers should be careful about the causes of out-of-wedlock childbearing and the 
reasons for welfare reform.  
We leave the possibility of cohabitation out of the picture in this analysis. 
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Cohabiting unions are an alternative living arrangement to marriage and a growing 
proportion of the population are currently or ever cohabitated. Cohabitation can also 
offer the benefits of specialization in the household. This union accounts for some of the 
decrease in marriages in recent decades.33 Conventional models are unable to make the 
distinction between marriage and living together. The legal role of marriage is 
fundamental to distinguish both. Thus, a model incorporating cohabitation is essential 
and will shed some light on future analysis of the marriage market. 
  
 
                                                 
33 In 1995, 7 percent of women 15-44 years of age were currently cohabitating. 10 percent of never 
married women aged 15-44 were ever cohabitated. See Bramlett and Mosher (2002). 
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APPENDIX A 
Tables and Figures 
 
 
TABLE 1—Percent Ever Married by Gender and Demographic Group, 
Aged 18-44, 1960-2000 
 
 Men Women 
 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000  1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
I. All 74.8 70.2 63.7 60.6 58.8  84.5 78.9 72.6 69.2 66.3
Weighted by 19701   64.2 55.9 52.5    73.5 66.2 61.3
            
II. By Education            
Education<12 years 76.1 71.3 59.7 52.6 51.7  87.7 82.6 74.4 66.3 60.9
Education=12 years 73.8 70.9 63.6 59.8 57.8  84.4 81.0 75.9 72.7 67.9
Education 13-15 years 66.5 58.0 59.1 58.6 57.3  75.3 66.6 64.5 65.7 64.1
Education≥ 16 years 81.1 80.9 73.7 70.1 67.5  80.0 77.8 72.7 71.3 70.5
            
III. By Race and 
Ethnicity            
Black 70.5 64.2 53.1 47.2 48.7  80.7 73.2 58.9 51.2 47.6
White2 75.4 70.9 65.3 63.3 61.5  85.0 79.7 74.8 72.5 70.1
Hispanic . 72.9 64.6 57.6 57.3  . 80.6 73.3 68.5 67.3
Others 61.8 60.4 59.9 55.4 53.8  79.7 74.9 73.0 68.9 64.5
            
IV. By Age            
18~24 35.4 33.4 24.3 16.2 17.1  59.6 51.8 39.7 28.0 25.0
25~34 83.8 84.5 76.1 64.9 61.1  91.4 90.0 83.8 75.3 70.3
35~44 91.8 92.2 92.1 87.3 82.1  94.1 94.4 94.0 90.2 86.6
            
V. By Region            
Midwest 75.9 71.5 64.6 62.0 59.0  84.9 79.0 72.8 69.7 66.4
Northeast 72.8 67.4 59.0 55.7 54.8  80.7 74.8 67.0 63.4 61.5
South 75.0 71.7 66.7 63.4 61.5  85.7 81.3 75.5 71.8 68.7
West 75.4 69.4 62.7 59.3 57.5 87.7 80.2 73.6 70.3 66.6
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TABLE 1—Continued 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adjusted within education (the demographic population weight in 1970 is used)3: 
 
Education<12 years  71.3 66.4 56.4 52.9   82.6 77.4 67.5 60.8
Education=12 years  70.9 65.0 56.6 51.9   81.0 76.1 69.6 64.0
Education 13-15 years  58.0 52.1 46.0 45.4   66.6 60.5 55.3 53.7
Education≥ 16 years  80.9 72.5 64.8 61.7   77.8 70.5 64.4 62.6
1. The weight of population composition in 1970 is used. Population is divided into 4 
educational levels, 4 races/ethnicities, 4 regions and 3 age groups. There are totally 192 
cells. 
2. Nonhispanic white after 1970 
3. Within education, demographic distribution is fixed in 1970 based on 4 races/ethnicities, 4 
regions and 3 age groups. 
 
Source: Tabulations from IPUMS 
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TABLE 2—Mean Age at First Marriage for Women, Aged 18-44, 1971-
1995 
 
 
 
 
 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94
20.1 20.5 20.7 21.5 22.7 24.0 25.0 All 
(3.0) 1 (3.1) (3.2) (3.5) (4.0) (4.6) (5.0) 
All (Median) 19.6 20 20.2 20.9 22.1 23.3 24.2 
        
I. By Education        
Education<12 years 19.1 19.4 19.5 20.0 20.9 22.2 22.4 
Education=12 years 19.9 20.2 20.2 20.8 21.8 23.0 24.2 
Education 13-15 years 20.4 20.6 20.8 21.6 22.7 23.7 24.6 
Education≥ 16 years 21.9 22.2 22.5 23.7 25.0 26.2 27.2 
        
II. By Race and Ethnicity        
Black 20.2 20.6 21.1 22.4 23.6 25.0 26.3 
White (nonhispanic) 19.8 20.4 20.8 21.5 22.6 24.0 24.1 
Hispanic 20.0 20.4 20.6 21.2 22.3 23.0 23.8 
        
III. By Region        
Northeast 20.8 21.2 21.4 22.3 23.7 25.1 26.3 
Midwest 20.1 20.5 20.6 21.3 22.5 23.9 24.9 
South 19.6 20.1 20.3 21.0 22.0 23.3 24.3 
West 20.0 20.5 20.8 21.6 22.7 23.9 24.7 
1. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
Source: Tabulations from the June Current C PS 
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TABLE 3—First Marriage Spell (in Months) for Female Population, 
Aged 18-54, 1971-1995 
 
 
Year 
Percent 
Ever 
Married 
(%) 
Overall 
Average 
Spell 
Length  
Complete 
Spell1 
Right 
Censored 
Spell2 
Proportion 
of complete 
Spell (%)  
Proportion 
of ongoing 
Spell (%) 
1971 79.55 166.55 
112.08 
(94.58)3 
180.07 
(117.84) 
19.89 80.11 
1975 75.1 162.55 
108.56 
(90.76) 
178.39 
(119.69) 
22.69 77.31 
1980 73.12 159.27 
107.35 
(87.37) 
177.79 
(118.98) 
26.29 73.71 
1985 71.7 152.87 
103.39 
(82.65) 
173.58 
(118.78) 
29.51 70.49 
1990 70.18 151.17 
102.65 
(81.39) 
173.84 
(117.24) 
31.84 68.16 
1995 68.17 152.89 
104.36 
(77.42) 
176.84 
(117.71) 
33.05 66.95 
1. After the first marriage, the average months to the end of the first marriage. 
2. After the first marriage, the average months to the date of survey for those currently 
married women. 
3. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
Source: Tabulations from the June CPS 
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TABLE 4—Fertility Rate1 Per 1,000 Women, Aged 18-44, 1971-2000 
 
 
1971 1977 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
 
All 83.4 70.1 71.1 68.6 70.8 65.4 66.4 
       
I. By Education        
Education<12 years 98.2 84.7 95.5 104.7 95.1 83.3 88.7 
Education=12 years 82.9 73 73.5 69 75.7 68 70.1 
Education 13-15 
years 67.3 58.8 58.2 57.8 57.4 56.2 54.2 
Education≥ 16 years 79.4 60 58.7 57.6 65 63.8 65.6 
        
II. By Race and 
Ethnicity         
Black 99.3 82.5 83.9 75.2 83 74.3 63.5 
White2 81.0 64.8 65.5 63.3 65.3 60.9 61.7 
Hispanic  104.5 106.7 107.3 100 83.1 99.1 
        
III. By Age        
18~24 115 93.8 96.5 95.4 99.2 93.9 87.5 
25~34 105.5 88 88.6 90.2 95.4 90.8 97.5 
35~44 24.2 17.6 19.1 17.4 23.7 24.1 27.8 
        
IV. By Current Martial 
Status         
Currently Married 105.5 92.6 95.1 91.7 92.5 85.4 88.5 
Divorced/ 
Widowed 31.5 28.9 27.4 27.5 26 28.2 30.4 
Single 16.5 22.6 28.4 33.4 43 41.5 41.6 
Adjusted fertility rate within education (the demographic population weight in 
1977 is used)3: 
Education<12 years  84.7 89.3 91.4 87.6 67.2 73.4 
Education=12 years  73 73.8 71.9 81.7 82.4 81.2 
Education 13-15 years  58.8 58.8 59.5 59.4 62.1 60.9 
Education≥ 16 years  60 58.9 59.9 71.3 68.6 70.1 
1. Rates are the number of live births in previous year per 1,000 women, aged 18-44. 
2. Nonhispanic white after 1975 
3. There are 48 cells based on 4 education levels, 3 age and 4 race/ethnicity groups. 
 
Source: Tabulations from the June CPS 
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TABLE 5—Mean Age at First Birth for Women, Aged 18-44, 1971-1994 
 
 
 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94
 
21.1 
 
21.2 
 
21.6 
 
22.6 
 
23.7 
 
24.6 
 
25.3  All (3.4)1 (3.5) (3.6) (4.1) (4.6) (5.1) (5.5) 
All (Median) 20.6 20.7 21.1 22.1 23.2 24.3 24.8 
Diff. to mean at first 
marriage2 1.0 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.0 0.7 0.3 
        
I. By Education        
Education<12 years 19.8 19.8 19.7 20.1 20.6 21.2 21.1 
Education=12 years 21.1 21.1 21.3 21.9 22.7 23.5 23.9 
Education 13-15 
years 21.6 21.6 21.9 23.0 24.1 25.0 25.2 
Education≥ 16 years 23.2 23.6 24.3 26.0 27.3 28.6 29.8 
        
II. By Race and 
Ethnicity         
Black 19.7 19.5 19.9 20.6 21.5 22.3 22.7 
White (nonhispanic) 20.9 21.4 22.1 23.2 24.3 25.4 26.0 
Hispanic 20.5 20.7 21.1 21.6 22.1 23.0 23.3 
        
III. By Region        
Northeast 21.8 21.8 22.1 23.3 24.5 25.6 26.7 
Midwest 21.1 21.3 21.5 22.5 23.6 24.5 25.0 
South 20.6 20.8 21.1 22.0 23.0 24.0 24.6 
West 21.0 21.3 21.7 22.7 23.7 24.7 25.1 
        
IV. Premarital/Marital 
birth        
Premarital 18.7 18.8 19.1 19.6 20.3 21.0 21.2 
Marital 21.4 21.7 22.2 23.4 24.7 26.0 27.0 
1. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
2. The difference between the mean age at first birth and mean age at first marriage. 
 
Source: Tabulations from the June CPS 
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TABLE 6—Fertility and Marriage Indicators by Cohort, 1940-2000 
 
 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
A. The average number of children born to ever-married women, aged 15-44 
15-44 1.90 1.84 2.31 2.36 1.92 1.76 1.80 
By Age        
15~24 .95 1.04 1.29 .99 .85 .93 .95 
25~34 1.71 1.86 2.45 2.37 1.69 1.59 1.59 
35~44 2.56 2.23 2.62 3.14 2.76 2.10 2.06  
B. The average number of children born to never-married women, aged 15-44 
15-44    .12 .17 .29 .42 
By Age        
15~24    .06 .09 .14 .22 
25~34    .40 .40 .54 .73 
35~44    .50 .63 .66 .86 
C. Fraction of women, aged 15-44, ever married 
15-44 .653 .756 .755 .689 .647 .637 .604 
By Age        
15~24 .321 .448 .414 .366 .292 .213 .181 
25~34 .815 .890 .914 .900 .839 .754 .703 
35~44 .898 .920 .941 .943 .940 .902 .866 
D. Fraction of women, aged 15-44, currently married1 
15-44 .611 .713 .716 .638 .566 .540 .512 
By Age        
15~24 .311 .433 .401 .348 .267 .195 .167 
25~34 .773 .850 .876 .839 .732 .653 .613 
35~44 .813 .845 .873 .857 .806 .733 .709 
1. Married, spouse present or not, or separated. 
 
Source: Tabulations from IPUMS, except for the fertility indicators in 2000 from the 
CPS June. 
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TABLE 7—Out-of-wedlock Childbearing Indicators, 1971-2000 
 
 
B. Percent of women who gave birth in the previous year, aged 18-44, were 
currently unmarried 
I. All 6.6 10.3 13.2 15.6 21.6 27.7 26.1 
        
II. By Education        
Education<12 years 10.9 18.2 23.6 27.1 38.3 47.4 41.3 
Education=12 years 6.5 10.3 12.5 16.3 24.9 32.8 32.8 
Education 13-15 
years 2.9 6.1 11.6 12.3 16.3 24.3 26.5 
Education≥ 16 
years 1.2 1.9 2.5 4.9 6.3 5 4.9 
        
III. By Race and 
Ethnicity         
Black 23.1 36.6 49.2 50.6 56.3 62.8 60.4 
White1 4.0 5.7 6.8 9.4 13.8 18.5 17.9 
Hispanic . 11.7 14.4 10.5 20.9 26.7 29.5 
        
IV. By Age        
18~24 9.8 18.1 20.4 26.6 41.3 51.8 51.4 
25~34 4.1 4.4 8.3 9.3 13.3 17 14.7 
35~44 2.1 11.5 5.9 10 10.7 13 12.2 
 
 
 1971 1977 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
A. Percent of births in the previous year to women by marital status, aged 18-44 
By Marital Status:        
Currently Married 93.4 89.7 86.8 84.4 78.4 72.3 73.9 
Divorced 2.3 2.7 3.5 3.9 3.8 4.9 3.5 
Never Married 4.3 7.6 9.6 11.7 17.9 22.9 22.7 
Adjusted within education (the demographic population weight in 1977 
is used)2: 
Education<12 years  18.2 22.2 27.8 36.9 48.0 41.0 
Education=12 years  10.3 11.5 15.7 23.9 33.9 32.7 
Education 13-15 
years  6.1 11.0 12.9 16.4 21.2 26.8 
Education≥ 16 years  1.9 2.4 3.4 6.1 5.1 4.3 
1. Nonhispanic white after 1975 
2. There are 48 cells based on 4 education levels, 3 age and 4 race/ethnicity groups. 
 
Source: Tabulations from the June CPS 
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TABLE 8—Percent of Never-married Women, Aged 18-44, Who 
Have at Least One Child, 1971-2000 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Adjusted within education (the demographic population weight in 1977 is 
used) 2: 
 Education<12 years  38.3 42.6 45.7 51.3 44.6 43.8 
 Education=12 years  14 15.2 17.9 21.8 30.5 33.1 
 Education 13-15 years  5.6 6.5 7.3 10.3 11.9 15.9 
 Education≥ 16 years  1.8 2.7 3.4 4.8 4.9 6.6 
1. Nonhispanic, white after 1975 
2. There are 48 cells based on 4 education levels, 3 age and 4 race/ethnicity groups. 
 
Source: Tabulations from the June CPS 
 
 
 1971 1977 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
I. All 8.1 12.4 14.1 16.8 22.6 26.0 28.6 
        
II. By Education        
Education<12 years 28.3 38.3 43 46.9 53.2 44 42.9 
Education=12 years 8.4 14 16.2 21.6 29.3 38.2 41.5 
Education 13-15 
years 1.6 5.6 7 9.8 14.5 18.1 23 
Education≥ 16 years 1 1.8 3.1 4 6.8 6.9 8.2 
        
III. By Race and 
Ethnicity         
Black 34 45.9 47.4 49 55.6 56.7 52.6 
White1 2.9 4 5.4 7.4 11 14 18 
Hispanic . 19.3 20.7 19.9 33.9 33.8 41.6 
        
IV. By Age        
18~24 6 9.3 10.8 12.4 15.6 18.5 20.6 
25~34 17.7 20.3 22.6 23.2 30.7 33.3 36.4 
35~44 12.4 26.1 20.7 27.6 33.5 37.4 40.5 
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TABLE 9—Percent of Ever-married Women, Aged 18-44, Yet to 
Have a Child, 1971-2000 
  
 
  
 1971 1977 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
I. All 15.6 19.4 18.7 20.3 19.3 19.0 18.9 
        
II. By Education        
Education<12 years 8 8.7 8.4 9.1 9.4 9.3 10.1 
Education=12 years 15.2 17.4 16.7 17.5 15.2 13.6 13.6 
Education 13-15 
years 21.8 24.4 21.8 22.3 21.1 20.2 19 
Education≥ 16 years 27.3 34.7 31.9 33 30 30.8 29.2 
        
III. By Race and 
Ethnicity         
Black 12.2 12.1 11.6 12 12.5 14 14.6 
White1 16.0 20.6 19.9 22 20.8 20.3 20.3 
Hispanic . 13.9 14.2 14.6 13.2 13.5 12.6 
        
IV. By Age        
18~24 37.7 44.2 41.2 41.9 39.3 37.1 36.3 
25~34 11.4 18.3 19.4 23.3 22.4 22.8 23.2 
35~44 6.8 7.4 7.3 9.9 11.8 12.8 13.4 
 
Adjusted within education (the demographic population weight in 1977 is used) 2:
 Education<12 years  8.7 8.0 9.2 9.5 10.0 12.1 
 Education=12 years  17.4 17.2 19.4 17.9 16.4 17.1 
 Education 13-15 years  24.4 24.0 26.5 26.2 25.1 24.5 
 Education≥ 16 years  34.7 34.6 38.4 36.7 38.4 36.9 
1. Nonhispanic, white after 1975 
2. There are 48 cells based on 4 education levels, 3 age and 4 race/ethnicity groups. 
 
Source: Tabulations from the June CPS 
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TABLE 10—Premarital First Birth Spell (in Months) for Female 
Population, Aged 18-44, 1971-1995 
 
 
Year 
Percent 
With 
Premarital 
Birth (%) 
Overall 
Average 
Spell 
Length 
Complete 
Spell1 
Right 
Censored 
Spell2 
Proportion 
of complete 
Spell (%) 
Proportion 
of ongoing 
Spell (%) 
1971 9.37 44.55 36.14 (40.63)3 
70.61 
(66.37) 75.61 24.39 
1977 15.08 50.03 37.09 (39.65) 
77.26 
(70.08) 67.79 32.21 
1980 16.58 49.38 35.12 (36.83) 
74.48 
(63.35) 63.77 36.23 
1985 19.88 55.75 38.65 (40.27) 
82.98 
(70.52) 61.42 38.58 
1990 24.04 63.15 42.24 (41.83) 
89.52 
(71.62) 55.77 44.23 
1995 31.42 71.65 51.98 (49.28) 
99.42 
(78.62) 58.54 41.46 
1.After premarital first birth, the average months to first marriage. 
2.After premarital first birth, the average months to date of survey. 
3.Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
Source: Tabulations from the June CPS 
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TABLE 11—Percent of Women with a Birth in the Previous Year, Aged 
18-44, in the Labor Force, 1971-2000 
 
 
  1971 1977 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
I. All 26.8 37.0 41.1 49.5 55.9 58.8 60.1 
        
II. By Education        
Education<12 years 22.3 35.8 28 30 32 39.2 39.5 
Education=12 years 27.1 38.6 41.9 50.3 55.9 56.7 62.7 
Education 13-15 years 31.1 33.8 49.5 56.5 63.4 64.3 65.8 
Education≥ 16 years 31.5 37.9 46.4 61 68.1 72.7 66.7 
        
III. By Race and 
Ethnicity         
Black 38.4 52.1 53.9 56.9 54.4 62.9 72.5 
White1 24.8 34 39.2 49.6 58.9 60.9 60.2 
Hispanic . 38.4 37.3 41 43.2 44.7 49.7 
        
IV. By Age        
18~24 31.3 41.6 43.1 47.7 48.7 51.3 57.2 
25~34 23 33.9 39.1 50.9 57.9 62.2 62 
35~44 23.8 35 44.3 48 63.7 63.3 60.4 
        
V. By Current Marital 
Status        
Currently Married 25.5 35.3 40.2 49.6 57.5 59.2 57.3 
Divorced/ Widowed 43.3 51.1 47.5 60.3 56.3 74.4 70.3 
Single 46.8 52.1 47.4 45.4 48.6 54.5 67.7 
1. Nonhispanic white after 1975 
 
Source: Tabulations from the June CPS
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TABLE 12—Female Labor Force Participation Rate1, Aged 25-54, 
1960-2000 
 
 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
I. All 0.413 0.490 0.631 0.741 0.735 
Weight by 1970   0.598 0.669 0.653 
      
II. By Education      
Education<12 years 0.391 0.446 0.500 0.525 0.490 
Education=12 years 0.411 0.498 0.630 0.716 0.691 
Education 13-15 years 0.437 0.508 0.686 0.791 0.780 
Education≥ 16 years 0.549 0.609 0.757 0.842 0.824 
      
III. By Race and 
Ethnicity       
Black 0.534 0.587 0.687 0.752 0.732 
White2 0.399 0.481 0.627 0.752 0.763 
Hispanic . 0.423 0.566 0.649 0.607 
      
IV. By Age      
25-34 0.350 0.448 0.647 0.739 0.728 
35~44 0.427 0.501 0.648 0.765 0.739 
45~54 0.467 0.525 0.586 0.710 0.738 
      
V. By Region      
Midwest 0.395 0.479 0.626 0.752 0.770 
Northeast 0.423 0.485 0.621 0.742 0.742 
South 0.419 0.503 0.635 0.740 0.723 
West 0.419 0.494 0.642 0.733 0.714 
Adjusted within education (the demographic population weight in 1970 is used) 
3: 
 Education<12 years  0.446 0.503 0.530 0.501 
 Education=12 years  0.498 0.626 0.717 0.707 
 Education 13-15 years  0.508 0.676 0.789 0.784 
 Education≥ 16 years  0.609 0.750 0.843 0.834 
1. The rate is defined as percentage of population who were not in the labor force last 
week.  
2. Nonhispanic white after 1970 
3. There are 48 cells based on 3 age, 4 race/ethnicity and 4 region groups. 
 
Source: Tabulations from IPUMS 
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TABLE 13—Labor Force Participation Indicators for Women Aged 25-54 
by Marital Status, 1960-2000 
 
 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
A. Labor Force Participation Rate 
Currently Married1 0.346 0.434 0.579 0.709 0.707 
Seperated/Divorced/Widowed 0.696 0.692 0.758 0.805 0.785 
Never Married 0.776 0.768 0.796 0.809 0.786 
 
B. Average Weeks Worked Last Year2 
Currently Married 36.3 36.9 40.8 43.3 45.0 
Seperated/Divorced/Widowed 42.0 42.4 44.0 45.0 45.9 
Never Married 45.6 45.1 45.3 45.5 45.7 
 
C. Average Annual Hours Worked3 
Currently Married1 1547 1573 1590 1726 1724 
Seperated/Divorced/Widowed 1727 1761 1795 1904 1857 
Never Married 1850 1813 1837 1923 1855 
1. Currently Married, spouse present or absent. 
2. For women who worked at least one week in previous calendar year.  
3. The sample is restricted to the women who worked last week, worked at least one week in 
previous calendar year, and were not self-employed. Weeks worked in the previous year and 
usual hours worked prior to 1970 were imputed. 
 
Source: Tabulation IPUMS 
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TABLE 14—Average Weeks Worked and Percent Worked Full-year for 
Currently Married Couples Aged 25-54 by Education, 1960-2000 
 
 Men Women 
 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000  1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
All Women: Weeks 
Worked            
Education<12 years 46.3 47.1 43.2 40.5 40.2  14.2 17.8 20.6 22.8 22.4
Education=12 years 49.5 49.8 47.7 46.5 46.3  14.8 19.6 25.9 31.7 33.8
Education 13-15 years 49.5 49.7 48.2 47.9 48.0  15.2 19.4 28.0 35.4 37.3
Education≥ 16 years 49.7 49.6 49.0 48.9 49.1  17.4 21.9 29.7 36.4 38.0
            
Working Women: 
Weeks Worked            
Education<12 years 47.3 48.8 47.1 45.7 46.6  35.3 37.5 39.3 39.9 40.9
Education=12 years 48.8 50.3 49.2 48.6 49.1  36.8 38.6 41.2 43.4 45.3
Education 13-15 years 49.9 50.3 49.5 49.3 49.7  35.9 37.6 40.9 43.9 45.8
Education≥ 16 years 50.0 50.0 49.7 49.7 50.0  34.8 35.8 39.6 43.3 45.1
            
Percent Worked Full 
Year1             
Education<12 years 68.2 74.4 65.8 59.3 59.7  15.1 20.3 25.9 29.9 30.1
Education=12 years 83.4 85.7 79.3 76.8 78.3  18.2 24.8 35.6 46.4 51.9
Education 13-15 years 85.8 86.8 82.5 81.8 83.3  17.4 23.2 37.9 52.3 58.0
Education≥ 16 years 84.4 83.4 82.8 83.6 85.2  13.8 17.8 31.1 46.6 53.7
1. Working full-year is defined as the individual who worked more than 50 weeks in the 
previous year. 
 
Source: Tabulation IPUMS 
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TABLE 15—Average Children Ever Had and Percent Childless for 
Women Aged 25-44 by Education and Age, 1960-2000
 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Average Children Ever Had:     
All Women 2.6 2.0 1.7 1.6 
     
Education<12 years:     
Age 25-34 2.9 2.3 2.2 2.2 
35-44 3.4 3.4 2.8 2.6 
Education=12 years:     
Age 25-34 2.1 1.6 1.6 1.6 
35-44 2.8 2.6 2.1 2.0 
Education 13-15 years:     
Age 25-34 1.8 1.3 1.2 1.3 
35-44 2.8 2.4 1.9 1.9 
Education≥ 16 years:     
Age 25-34 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.7 
35-44 2.3 1.9 1.5 1.5 
Percent Childless:     
All Women 15.9 22.7 27.2 26.9 
     
Education<12 years:     
Age 25-34 12.2 13.7 15.4 16.0 
35-44 11.3 8.8 10.8 12.6 
Education=12 years:     
Age 25-34 16.3 21.4 24.3 23.5 
35-44 11.4 9.9 13.0 15.3 
Education 13-15 years:     
Age 25-34 23.7 35.1 35.7 32.7 
35-44 12.8 13.1 17.8 18.3 
Education≥ 16 years:     
Age 25-34 42.5 55.7 59.6 57.3 
35-44 20.1 22.4 29.6 28.2 
Source: Tabulations from IPUMS and CPS June 1998, 2000, 2002. 
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TABLE 16—Logit Regression Prediction for Women Aged 25-54 by Different 
Base Year  
 
a. Logit Regression Prediction on Current Marital Status1 
 Prediction Difference
2 
( ij
i
d∑ ) 
Predication Difference3 
( 'ij
i
d∑ ) 
Education<12 years -0.229 -.225 
Education=12 years -0.186 -.200 
Education 13-15 years -0.166 -.169 
Education≥ 16 years -0.071 -.081 
   
Total -0.154 -.201 
 
b. Logit Regression Prediction on Labor Force Participation Status4  
 Prediction Difference 
( ij
i
d∑ ) 
Predication Difference 
( 'ij
i
d∑ ) 
Education<12 years .061 .124 
Education=12 years .207 .292 
Education 13-15 years .280 .350 
Education≥ 16 years .227 .282 
   
Total .220 .215 
1. The dependent variable is currently married or not. Explanatory variables include age, age 
square, education, region and race dummies. 
2. Specifically, we first compute )ˆ()ˆ( 19602000,20002000, ββ ii xx Λ−Λ . 2000βˆ  is the vector of 
estimated coefficients using sample from 2000, xi is the vector of individual i’s characteristics, 
and )ˆ( 20002000, βixΛ  is the predicted probability of being currently married for individual i in 
2000. Likewise, 1960βˆ and )ˆ( 19601960, βixΛ represent the vector of estimated coefficients and 
predicted probability using data from 1960. In addition, we apply the data from 2000 using the 
coefficients estimating from 1960’s sample and get the predicted values: )ˆ( 19602000, βixΛ . 
After taking difference between )ˆ()ˆ( 19602000,20002000, ββ ii xx Λ−Λ  , we sum up the 
differences separately by the four education and obtain the final result. 
3. Similarly, we compute )ˆ()ˆ( 19601960,20001960, ββ ii xx Λ−Λ  and then sum up with respect to 
four education levels. 
4. The dependent variable is currently in the labor force or not. Explanatory variables include age, 
age square, education, region race dummies and dummy for children under 5 in the family. 
 
Source: Tabulation IPUMS 
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TABLE 17—Female-Male Average Weekly Wage Ratios by Race and 
Education, 1960-2000 
 
 
 
 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
1960-2000
(% change)
All Workers 62 57.6 57.3 64.3 70.5 13.7 
White:       
Education<12 years       
All 60.8 58 59 66.3 70.2 15.5 
Age 25-34 60.5 58.4 62.8 70.9 74.4 23.0 
Education=12 years       
All 59.4 56.6 57.2 64 68.6 15.5 
Age 25-34 63.1 59.7 62.1 70.9 72.9 15.5 
Education 13-15 years       
All  56.9 54.9 57 64.4 69.4 22.0 
Age 25-34 63.9 62.7 66.2 74.3 74.6 16.7 
Education≥ 16 years       
All  63.3 60.6 58.8 63 67.9 7.3 
Age 25-34 75.3 72 74.2 78.9 80.2 6.5 
       
Black:       
Education<12 years       
All Women 66.2 68.3 72.7 77 81 22.4 
Age 25-34 66.2 69.3 76.9 81.6 88 32.9 
Education=12 years       
All  70.3 69.3 70.4 75.6 80.6 14.7 
Age 25-34 72.6 70.8 76.5 82.8 84.7 16.7 
Education 13-15 years       
All  74.2 71.8 72.2 78.9 81.2 9.4 
Age 25-34 69.5 70.7 75.4 83.7 82.3 18.4 
Education≥ 16 years       
All  93.1 86.1 83 82.6 85.6 -8.1 
Age 25-34 93.4 89.4 85.1 91.6 88.7 -5.0 
Note: The Data are restricted to individuals who are not enrolled in school, are wage and 
salary employees, worked at least 27 weeks and 35 hours per week in the prior year, and 
have potential experience of 1-40 years. Equal-weighted average across potential 
experience is imposed. 
 
Source: Tabulation IPUMS 
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TABLE 18—Assortative Mating on Years of Schooling, 
1960-2000 (Selected Years) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Odds Ratio 
Husband’s schooling Wife’s 
Schooling < 9 9-11 12 13-15 ≥ 16 Total 
1960:       
< 9 17.9 4.2 2.4 0.5 0.2 25.2 
9-11 8.0 7.6 4.9 1.3 0.6 22.4 
12 6.0 7.5 14.5 4.5 3.7 36.2 
13-15 1.0 1.1 2.5 2.4 3.1 10.1 
≥ 16 0.3 0.4 0.9 0.9 3.8 6.2 
Total 33.2 20.8 25.1 9.6 11.4 100.0 
 
1980:       
< 9 4.5 1.5 1.4 0.4 0.2 7.9 
9-11 3.2 4.4 4.7 1.3 0.4 13.9 
12 3.2 5.7 22.3 8.3 5.5 45.0 
13-15 0.5 1.0 4.3 5.5 6.5 17.9 
≥ 16 0.2 0.3 1.5 2.3 11.1 15.3 
Total 11.6 12.8 34.2 17.7 23.7 100.0 
 
2000:       
< 9 1.2 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.1 2.3 
9-11 0.6 1.3 1.9 0.7 0.2 4.6 
12 1.0 2.5 15.7 8.0 3.3 30.4 
13-15 0.4 1.2 8.7 14.6 8.6 33.4 
≥ 16 0.1 0.2 2.9 6.5 19.4 29.2 
Total 3.2 5.6 29.7 30.0 31.5 100.0 
Note: The sample includes currently married women, aged 25-54, with 
spouses present. 
 
Source: Tabulations from IPUMS
 
Odds 1 
(The same education 
level) 
Odds 2 
(Differ by at most one 
education level) 
1960 0.86 4.50 
1970 0.85 4.75 
1980 0.91 5.29 
1990 1.00 7.23 
2000 1.09 8.32 
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TABLE 19—Summary Statistics (Means) 
  1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Whites:       
 Variables      
Age 37.3 38.3 38.4 39.3 41.6 
Percent with kids under 5 36.4 26.8 22.5 23.0 17.8 
Schooling 11.0 11.6 12.4 13.3 13.8 
Weeks worked last year1 41.5 42.7 40.5 43.2 45.4 
Usual hours worked2 36.7 35.6 34.1 35.7 36.7 
Log hourly wage rate 
(imputed wages included) 0.32 0.76 1.51 2.10 2.53 
Wives:  
Percent wages imputed 76.0 66.4 43.5 30.6 27.7 
       
Age 40.3 41.3 41.0 41.7 43.8 
Schooling 10.9 11.8 12.9 13.5 13.8 
Weeks worked last year 49.4 50.3 49.2 48.9 49.4 
Usual hours worked 44.8 44.5 44.4 45.4 46.0 
Log hourly wage rate 
(imputed wages included) .89 1.39 2.11 2.60 2.93 
Percent wages imputed 24.3 19.2 14.7 13.5 14.1 
      
Husbands: 
Number of observations 221,402 222,289 229,692 269,476 273,029 
Blacks:      
Age 36.7 37.8 38.0 39.2 41.2 
Percent with kids under 5 38.3 28.4 24.0 21.6 15.6 
Schooling 9.12 10.5 11.9 13.0 13.4 
Weeks worked last year 40.8 43.4 43.3 45.0 45.8 
Usual hours worked 35.7 36.9 36.5 38.4 39.0 
Log hourly wage rate 
(imputed wages included) -0.20 .54 1.52 2.11 2.51 
Wives: 
Percent wages imputed 72.3 55.9 40.9 21.5 21.8 
      
Age 40.1 41.0 40.9 41.7 43.5 
Schooling 7.9 9.6 11.3 12.6 13.0 
Weeks worked last year 46.7 48.9 47.4 47.4 47.9 
Usual hours worked 41.4 41.4 40.6 42.2 43.1 
Log hourly wage rate 
(imputed wages included) .39 .99 1.87 2.39 2.72 
Percent wages imputed 26.9 21.3 16.6 13.0 16.1 
      
Husbands: 
Number of observations 18,376 18,199 18,852 17,582 20,961 
Note: The sample includes married women with spouse present aged 25-50 in 1960, 26-51 in 1970, 
27-52 in 1980, 28-53 in 1990 and 29-54 in 2000. The sample is also restricted to couples where the 
wives are no more than 10 years younger than their husbands and husbands are no more than 15 years 
older than their wives.  
 
1.For individuals who worked both last year and last week in 1960 and 1970, and worked last year 
after 1980.Values were imputed before 1970. 
2. For individuals who worked both last year and last week in 1960 and 1970, and worked last year 
after 1980. Values were imputed before 1970.
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TABLE 20—Estimated Coefficients of Correlation in Residual Log Hourly 
Wages 
 
 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Whites:      
Without education control 0.074 0.093 0.108 0.157 0.175 
With education control 0.023 0.029 0.061 0.074 0.082 
      
Blacks:      
Without education control 0.119 0.148 0.170 0.189 0.160 
With education control 0.056 0.076 0.129 0.112 0.090 
Note: The sample includes women aged 25-50 in 1960, 26-51 in 1970, 27-52 in 1980, 28-53 in 
1990 and 29-54 in 2000. The sample is also restricted to couples where the wives are no more 
than 10 years younger than the husbands and their husbands are no more than 15 years older than 
their wives. The wife’s age, its square, husband’s age, its square and region dummies are the 
explanatory variables in the regression. 
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TABLE 21—Estimated Coefficients of Wives Education’s Dummies on 
Husband’s Log Hourly Wages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1960 2000  
White:   The Marginal Increase 
High School Dropout 0.16 (.004)1 
0. 13 
(.011)  
College Graduates 0. 45 (.005) 
0. 65 
(.009) 
 
Difference 0.29 0.52 0.22 
    
Black:    
High School Dropout 0. 15 (.012) 
0. 01 
(.036)  
College Graduates 0. 47 (.023) 
0. 44 
(.033) 
 
Difference 0.32 0.43 0.11 
Note: The dependent variable is husband’s log hourly wage. Independent variables include 
wife’s education dummies, husbands’ and wives’ age, their squares, and region dummies. 
The omitted group is wives with schooling less than 9 years. The sample selection is the 
same to Table 12. 
 
1. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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TABLE 22—Trends in Currently Married Status within Education and Age by Gender and 
Race, 1960-2000 
 
 
  White Men   Black Men 
Schooling Age 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000  1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
<12 25-34 0.994 0.971 0.990 0.899 0.898  0.993 0.944 0.837 0.564 0.478 
<12 35-44 0.973 0.967 0.958 0.887 0.803  0.991 0.970 0.943 0.775 0.583 
<12 45-54 0.983 0.970 0.967 0.939 0.860  0.996 0.985 0.959 0.872 0.727 
12 25-34 1.028 1.036 1.043 1.010 0.958  1.018 1.054 1.044 0.970 0.936 
12 35-44 1.021 1.018 1.021 0.984 0.941  1.011 1.023 1.016 0.975 0.924 
12 45-54 1.025 1.017 1.021 1.007 0.954  1.011 1.017 1.033 1.026 0.949 
13-15 25-34 0.973 0.974 0.987 1.030 1.048  1.014 1.054 1.058 1.191 1.226 
13-15 35-44 1.025 1.011 0.999 1.002 1.019  1.051 1.073 1.024 1.072 1.152 
13-15 45-54 1.026 1.029 1.007 1.006 0.995  0.984 1.050 1.047 1.064 1.079 
≥ 16 25-34 0.982 0.988 0.963 1.004 1.032  1.019 1.059 1.107 1.315 1.276 
≥ 16 35-44 1.029 1.026 1.006 1.052 1.117  1.096 1.144 1.128 1.219 1.372 
≥ 16 45-54 1.034 1.034 1.013 1.025 1.079  1.107 1.159 1.131 1.166 1.285 
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TABLE 22—Continued  
 
  White Women   Black Women 
Schooling Age 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000  1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
<12 25-34 0.994 0.970 0.992 0.926 0.941  0.984 0.926 0.781 0.636 0.627 
<12 35-44 0.989 0.974 0.964 0.912 0.861  0.979 0.953 0.892 0.734 0.661 
<12 45-54 1.007 0.979 0.964 0.933 0.880  0.994 0.965 0.934 0.856 0.771 
12 25-34 1.023 1.040 1.058 1.053 1.007  1.039 1.061 1.077 0.942 0.906 
12 35-44 1.024 1.027 1.034 1.034 0.991  1.067 1.045 1.065 1.011 0.915 
12 45-54 1.016 1.031 1.034 1.053 1.032  1.016 1.073 1.069 1.028 0.975 
13-15 25-34 0.991 0.999 0.979 1.009 1.021  1.027 1.085 1.016 1.103 1.104 
13-15 35-44 1.004 1.008 0.986 0.991 0.998  1.043 1.091 1.029 1.004 1.063 
13-15 45-54 1.003 1.007 1.001 0.988 0.993  0.983 1.117 1.068 1.043 1.027 
≥ 16 25-34 0.918 0.916 0.911 0.946 0.987  0.976 1.104 1.156 1.301 1.213 
≥ 16 35-44 0.924 0.956 0.966 1.002 1.049  1.039 1.185 1.131 1.264 1.288 
≥ 16 45-54 0.871 0.941 0.958 0.962 1.003  1.128 1.153 1.138 1.191 1.190 
Note: Ratio=
ji
ji
y
x
,
, =(Of those currently married and in age group j, the percent with education i) / (Of those in age 
group j, the percent with education i) 
where i is ≤ 12, 12, 13-15 , ≥ 16 years of schooling. j is age 25-34, 35-44 or 45-54.  
 
Source: Tabulations from IPUMS         
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FIGURE 1.  Percent of Births to Unmarried Women by 
Race and Ethnicity, 1960-1999 
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FIGURE 2.  Fertility Rate Trends: Fertility Rate per 1,000 
Women Aged 15-44 by Marital Status, 1960-1999 
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(b) For Women 
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FIGURE 3.  Fraction Ever Married Relative to 1970 
by Age, 1960-2000 
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FIGURE 4.  Fraction of Ever-married Women Who 
Had at Least One Child Relative to 1970 by Age, 
1960-2000 
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(a) Female Labor Force Participation Rate 
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(b) Average Weeks Worked in the Previous Year 
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FIGURE 5.  Female Labor Market Attachment by Cohort and 
Age 
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(a) The Ratio of Participation 
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(b) The Ratio of Average Weeks Worked in the Previous Year 
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FIGURE 6.  The Comparison of Labor Market Attachment 
for Women Without Children Under Age 6 Relative to 
Those With Children Under Age 6 by Cohort and Age 
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(a) Percent in the Labor Force in the Previous Year 
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(b) Percent Worked During the Last Week 
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Source: Tabulation from IPUMS and CPS June 1998, 2000, 2002 
 
FIGURE 7.  Percent in the Labor Force/Worked for Women Age 35-
44 by Number of Children and Education 
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(a) White  
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(b) Black 
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Source: Tabulation from IPUMS and CPS June 1998, 2000, 2002  
 
FIGURE 8.  Percent Currently Married for Women Age 35-44 by 
Number of Children and Education 
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(a) Women Without Children Under Age 5 
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(b) Women With Children Under Age 5 
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FIGURE 9.  Percent Currently Married vs. Percent in the Labor Force for 
Women Age 25-54
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(a) Real Average Weekly Wages 
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(b) Real Median Weekly Wages 
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FIGURE 10.  Real Weekly Wages (in 2000 Dollars) by Education and Gender, 
1960-2000 
 
Note: The Data are restricted to individuals who are not enrolled in school, are wage and salary 
employees, worked at least 27 weeks and 35 hours per week in the prior year, and have potential 
experience of 1-40 years. Estimated real earnings are calculated with equal-weighted average across 
potential experience and adjusted using the 2000 Implict Price Deflator.  
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FIGURE 11.  The Change in the Marriage Market  
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APPENDIX B  
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FIGURE 1a.  Fraction of white men aged 
25-34 who worked last year 
 by education, 1960-2000 
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FIGURE 1b.  Fraction of white men aged 
24-35 who worked at least 26 weeks by 
education, 1960-2000 
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FIGURE 1c.  Fraction of black men aged 
25-34 who worked last year by 
education, 1960-2000 
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FIGURE 1d.  Fraction of black men aged 
25-34 who worked at least 26 weeks by 
education, 1960-2000 
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